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This dissertation delves into corporate behavior around the 1997 Asian crisis 
which had a significant effect on Korean firms and the economy. It includes three 
main parts. 
Chapter 2 looks at corporate governance and firm value in Korea. Since the Asian 
crisis the corporate governance issue has changed remarkably in Korea. The Korean 
government has amended many provisions regarding this issue. This paper first 
surveys the series of amendments to associated provisions and laws. Then we 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm value using the 
long-term event study method to see how these amendments affect firm value.  
Chapter 3 examines the structural changes of seventy firms in the Korean Stock 
Exchange around the Asian crisis under the assumption that break dates are unknown. 
The Korean economy was broken up by the crisis in 1997 and then it took some years 
for it to be recovered through the effort of the government and firms.  Thus, it is 
natural to think that firms’ specific parameters might have been changed reflecting 
firms’ efforts to survive the crisis. This paper assumes that the structural break dates 
are unknown. Then we estimate them and test for structural change of unknown timing 
around the crisis on each of seventy firms in the KSE. 
Chapter 4 is an empirical investigation of insider trading. The Korean economy 
had a hard time during the Asian crisis. To restructure and reform the economy the 
Korean government implemented IMF guidelines which it agreed to follow when 
receiving IMF’s $57 billion rescue bailout package. In this chapter we evaluate the 
 ii 
 
restructuring and reform in the past decade in terms of the cleanliness of the stock 
market in terms of insider trading. Considering the provisions regarding insider 
trading in Korea, it is hard to quantify the degree of insider trading using only reported 
insider trading data. Thus, this paper adopts the event study method to analyze the 
degree of insider trading before and after the reforms.  We find that there is evidence 
suggesting that there was insider trading before the crisis reforms which was 
subsequently (or eliminated) following these reforms. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Korean economy, which was devastated by the Korean War of 1950, has 
continued to grow rapidly on the basis of strong government-driven economic policies 
since the 1960s, such as the protection of domestic industries aided by import barriers, 
focusing on exports and industrialization. As the size of its economy got bigger in the 
1980s, and there began to be a growing doubt about these government-led policies, its 
economic policies veered to liberalization and opening of the economy. In the early 
1980s, the commercial banks were privatized, and on August 23, 1991 the 'phase-4 
interest rate liberalization plan' was announced. The full-blown efforts of Korea to 
open its capital market were made as part of its endeavor to globalize its economy and 
join OECD, and it started with the 'phase-3 banking financial deregulation and market 
opening plan' in June 1993. From 1994 to 1996 the government deregulated the 
overseas activities of banking and non-banking financial institutions to a great extent, 
and accordingly domestic banks opened 28 overseas branches. The Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act was enacted and enforced in April 1981, but the 
government's intervention in industrial policies, such as entry barriers and investment 
adjustment, and wide-ranging price regulation continued. After the launch of a new 
government in the late 1980s, substantial regulatory reform took place. In line with 
this, regulation of the Chaebols1  (conglomerates) was gradually reinforced. On top of 
this trend, the Korean economy was influenced by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
and accelerated its opening and liberalization. 
                                                 
1
 The term, Chaebols, is used in this paper as an interchangeable word with business groups or 
conglomerates. 
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Table 1.1 shows the macro variables prior to the crisis. As this table indicates, the 
macro variables did not show anything special enough to foretell any crisis. 
 
Table 1.1 Macro Variables in 1990s 
(Unit: %) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Budget Deficit / 
GDP -1.8 -0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 -1.4 -3.9 
Trade Deficit / 
GDP -2.7 -1.2 0.2 -1.0 -1.7 -4.1 -1.6 11.7 
REER* 117.0 110.0 106.9 108.1 109.4 113.3 106.9 81.5 
Real Interest Rate 
(CB) 7.9 9.6 10.0 7.8 6.7 9.3 6.9 9.0 
Real Growth 
Rate (M3) 14.4 13.2 11.9 15.6 10.8 11.0 8.9 6.2 
Inflation Rate 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 
Real GDP 
Growth Rate 9.4 5.9 6.1 8.5 9.2 7.0 4.7 -6.9 
REER*: Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Source: Bank of Korea, OECD 
 
 
The trends in the total external liabilities of the 1990s tell us that the total external 
liabilities exhibited a low growth rate in the early 1990s, whereas in the mid-1990s 
they grew more than 30%. In particular, short-term foreign debt relative to foreign 
exchange reserves rapidly increased. This shows that the vulnerability of the Korean 
economy to foreign currency liquidity is increasing. The trends in total external 
liabilities are summarized in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2 External Liabilities in Korea in 1990s 
(Unit: $ 0.1 billion, %) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total External Liabilities  629.0 670.0 887.0 1197.0 1643.4 1580.6 1493.5 
                                           
(change rate) _ 6.5 32.4 35.0 37.3 -3.8 -5.5 
External Liabilities / GDP 20.0 19.4 22.0 24.5 31.6 33.2 46.5 
Short Term Liabilities / 
Total Liabilities 58.8 60.2 65.8 65.8 56.6 40.0 20.6 
Short Term Liabilities / 
ForEx reserves 215.7 198.9 227.5 240.6 279.8 309.8 59.2 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 
The asset quality of the financial sector can be indirectly measured by the financial 
health of the company. In Korea it can be said that the financial health of the Chaebols 
with large assets and liabilities is more important. Table 1.3 shows the ROA trends.  
 
Table 1.3 ROAs of the Top 30 Chaebols in Korea 
(Unit: %) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1st-5th Chaebols 1.86 3.54 4.86 1.41 0.43 
6th-10th Chaebols 0.87 1.17 1.10 -0.49 -2.15 
11th-30th Chaebols -0.40 -0.06 -0.08 0.08 -3.00 
Total Average 1.11 2.19 3.15 0.23 -2.13 
Source: Fair Trade Commission 
 
According to this table, the Chaebols ranked between 11th and 30th place2 were in 
the negative from 1993 to 1995. The profitability of the Chaebol groups is 
                                                 
2
 Through 2001, the Fair Trade Commission had been announcing the top thirty business groups 
annually to regulate them. Since 2002, however, it has announced three kinds of business groups each 
year to more efficiently regulate them: business groups subject to the limitations on debt guarantees, 
business groups subject to the limitations on mutual investment, and business groups subject to the 
limitations on total investment amount. 
 4 
deteriorating. Considering the fact that the Korean economy was booming in the 1994-
1995 period, this deterioration can be said to be all the more serious. 
 
Figure 1.1 Spread and Exchange Rate 
Source: Bloomberg, Bank of Korea, KDI Report 2007 
The most common indicator for Korea's credit rating in the international financial 
market is the foreign currency spread3 of the Industrial Bank of Korea. It got worse 
rapidly in late October, early November, and December of 1997. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
this spread. 
As shown in Table 1.4, six Chaebol groups on the top 30 list in 1997 began to go 
bankrupt on January 23 in 1997, starting with the bankruptcy of Hanbo, ranked 13th. 
Accordingly, Moody's degraded the national credit rating of Korea from P14 to P25 on 
                                                 
3
 The spread between the interest rate of U.S. T-bills and that of bonds which the Industrial Bank of 
Korea issues. 
4
 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-1 have a superior ability to repay short-term debt 
obligations. 
5
 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-2 have a strong ability to repay short-term debt 
obligations. 
 5 
August 5th, and S&P lowered the national credit rating from `stable' to `negative' on 
August 6th. The credit rating of Korea was downgraded again in October at the height 
of the Asian financial crisis, triggered by the crisis in Thailand.6 
 
Table 1.4 Top 30 Chaebols Bankrupt in 1997 
  Hanbo Sammi Jinro Kia Hiti New Core 
Bankruptcy Date Jan. 23 Mar. 19 Apr. 21 Jul. 15 Nov. 1 Nov. 4 
Ranking 14th 25th 19th 8th 24th 28th 
 
Afterward, international creditors indiscriminately withdrew their savings from 
Korean banks in November, and as commercial banks could not cope with this exodus, 
they received emergency funds from the foreign currency reserves of the Bank of 
Korea. However, the reserves dried up, and the Korean Government ended up 
applying for IMF relief loans on November 21st. Table 1.5 shows the available foreign 
currency reserves of the Bank of Korea in those days. 
There are differing opinions about what caused this financial crisis both at home 
and abroad, but on the whole the dominant opinion is that the instability of the 
international financial market and the insolvency of domestic banks and enterprises 
were the causes. To overcome this crisis, the government reformed the business sector, 
the financial sector, the labor market, and the public sector. The economic growth rate 
dropped to -6.9% in 1998, but then rose to 9.5% in 1999. In short, it recovered in a  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In addition to this, S&P and Moody's degraded the credit rating of Korea three times more in the year 
of 1997. S&P did on Nov. 26, on Dec.11, and on Dec. 23 in 1997. So did Moody's on Nov. 28, Dec. 10, 
and Dec. 22 in 1997. 
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Table 1.5 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(Unit: $ million) 
  
12.31 
1996 
3.31 
1997 
6.30 
1997 
9.30 
1997 
10.31 
1997 
11.30 
1997 
12.31 
1997 
1.31 
1998 
ForEx Reserves (A) 33.2 29.1 33.3 30.4 30.5 24.4 20.4 23.5 
Deposit Foreign Branch 
Holding (B) 3.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 16.9 11.3 10.9 
Miscellaneous (C) _ _ _ _ 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total ForEx Reserves 
[ A-(B+C)] 29.4 21.1 25.3 22.4 22.3 7.3 8.9 12.4 
Source: Bank of Korea 
 
short period of time. However, the policies based on the IMF guidelines resulted in 
side effects such as the rapid shrinkage of aggregate demands, the bankruptcy of 
sound enterprises owing to high interest rates, and the increase of nonperforming debts. 
About this some argue that these guidelines aggravated the problem by using the 
method IMF employed in South America while ignoring the characteristics of Korea. 
As the government policies began to stabilize the foreign exchange market, the 
government shifted gear to steps to stimulate the economy. Accordingly, attempts 
were made to reform the business, financial, labor, and public sector as mentioned 
above. Here, to be faithful to the objective of this study, only the structural reform of 
the business sector is examined. The priorities of the government's policy in the 
business sector were to handle insolvent enterprises incapable of redeeming debts and 
to reinforce the market regulations to prevent recurrence of an economic crisis. Table 
1.6 shows how the economy changed. The first four variables can be interpreted as 
variables which explain the quantitative growth of the economy and the next four the 
qualitative growth of the economy. The last six variables are considered as variables 
which tell about economic stability. While the rate of corporate debt has decreased a 
lot, government and household debt have increased. Compared to the amount of 
 7 
exchange reserves in 1997, it has been tremendously increased in these days. The BIS 
ratio7 is getting better. 
 
Table 1.6 Changes in Economic Variables 
Variable 
1991-
1997 
1999-
2002 
2003-
2006 
 Change Rate of Labor Input (%) 1.9 2.9 0.5 
Change Rate of Capital Input (%) 11.5 4.9 4.1 
Change Rate of Sales (%) 15.8 6.3 6.9 
Change Rate of Assets (%) 17.5 2.6 7.2 
 Change Rate of Labor Productivity (%) 4.8 4.4 3.1 
 ROA (%) 0.2 -0.1 0.8 
Change Rate of Operating Profits (%) 5.8 5.1 6.1 
Ordinary Margin (%) 1.7 1.5 5.9 
 Change Rate of Corporate Debt (%) 332.9 199.1 115.4 
Government Debt / GDP (%) 6.1 16.5 25.4 
Household Debt / GDP (%) 54.0 62.5 75.5 
Exchange Reserves ($ 0.1 mil) 233.1 986.2 2,009.4 
CPI (%) 5.8 2.5 3.0 
BIS Ratio (%) 9.6 10.7 11.6 
Source: SERI Report 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The Bank for International Settlements (or BIS) is an international organization of central banks. The 
BIS requires bank capital/asset ratio to be above a prescribed minimum international standard to protect 
of all central banks involved. Its main role is in setting capital adequacy requirements. BIS ratio = 
[capital/assets]*100 
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Table 1.7 Debts of Business Groups in 1997 
    (Unit: million won) 
  Business  Number of  Debts The Types of  
  Groups Affiliates(97) in 1997 Corporate Restructuring 
  Daewoo 250 25,347 Workout (8.26.99) 
  Kia 40 5,819 Legal Management (4.15.98) 
  Ssangyong 75 9,004 Workout (11.1.98) 
  Halla 36 4,501 Composition (3.20.98) 
  Kohap 25 3,384 Workout (7.14.98) 
TOP Donga 42 3,696 Legal Management (3.9.01) 
30 Jinro 32 1,443 Composition (2.3.98) 
Business Hanil 20 1,578 Legal Management (1.19.99) 
Groups Anam 34 2,217 Workout (10.30.98) 
  Haetae 37 3,254 Legal Management (4.11.01) 
  Sinho 33 1,569 Workout (7.1.98) 
  Dongil 18 1,373 Legal Management (4.23.99) 
  NewCore 18 691 Legal Management (11.16.98) 
  Dongkuk 24 1,091 Workout (10.27.98) 
  Saehan 24 1,805 Workout (5.27.98) 
  Gapul 23 832 Workout (7.24.98) 
  Kupyung 20 1,960 Workout (7.23.98) 
  17 Groups 731 67,604   
  Pucksan 20 1,064 Workout (8.14.98) 
  Daenong 26 1,137 Legal Management (12.30.98) 
TOP Woobang 14 833 Workout (7.25.98) 
31-63 Susan 18 506 Legal Management (9.22.98) 
Business Kangwon 29 1,566 Workout (7.28.98) 
Groups Chungoo 20 750 Legal Management (8.17.98) 
  Saepung 10 531 Workout (7.24.98) 
  Bosung 12 543 Workout (5.6.98) 
  Jindo 24 807 Workout (7.23.98) 
  Sinwon 26 870 Workout (7.24.98) 
  Nasan 20 881 Legal Management (7.14.98) 
  Kukdong 19 899 Legal Management (7.6.98) 
  Daedong 9 334 Composition (3.22.98) 
  13 Groups 969 77,991   
    998 80,284   
Source: BAI, KDI Report 2007   
 
 
1998 saw the start of corporate restructuring with public funds worth 64 billion 
Korean won. As shown in Table 1.7, 17 out of the top 30 business groups and 13 out 
of the top 31 to 60 business groups underwent corporate restructuring. The corporate 
 9 
restructuring consisted of three different kinds of restructuring processes. According to 
Korean commercial law, when a company cannot afford to pay debts or is in danger of 
bankruptcy, the company, creditors, or shareholders may file an application of court 
protection, called legal management. After the court's approval of the application, 
creditors cannot have an obligation satisfied until the court decides. In short, legal 
management refers to the court's supervision or management on behalf of the company. 
Composition refers to a voluntary agreement or contract entered into between creditors 
and debtors which would modify the amount due or the amount of loan, especially 
when the company is in danger of bankruptcy. In this case, for composition to be 
enforceable, the court has to ratify the agreement submitted by the company. 
In those days, insolvent businesses were handled primarily by means of the Big 
Deals8 between Chaebols and/or workouts.9 The main features of the structural reform 
in the business sector were summarized in the five rules, to which President Elect Dae-
Jung Kim and the leaders of the top 4 Chaebol groups agreed in January 1998: (i) 
enhancement of the transparency of business management, (ii) elimination of mutual 
guarantee (guarantee of obligations), (iii) drastic improvement of financial structure, 
(iv) concentration of competency on core businesses and reinforcement of cooperation 
with medium businesses, (v) reinforcement of the responsibilities of the controlling 
shareholder and the CEO. Also there were three tasks announced in the supplement 
thereof in August 1999:  (i') improvement of the corporate governance of the nonbank 
depository institutions, (ii') suppression of circular equity investment among affiliates 
and blocking of improper insider trading, (iii') prevention of irregular inheritance and 
donation. Conventionally, these five rules and three tasks are called the '5 plus 3 rules' 
                                                 
8
 Big Deals are the government-backed plans in Korea after the Asian crisis. For example, a Big Deal 
was that Samsung conglomerate was forced to sell its car unit to Daewoo in return for acquiring 
Daewoo's electronics business by one of the government-backed plans. 
9
 Workout refers to a series of activities which would improve the financial status of the company on 
the initiative of the creditors, usually banks. 
 10 
in Korea. These rules are contained in amendments of the Commercial Act and the 
Securities and Exchange Act. Table 1.8 shows the time line of the amendments. 
 
Table 1.8 Time Line 
 
    1st 2nd 3rd 
  
 
The  Submitted 7.7.98 11.12.99 12.31.00 
  
 
Commercial Passed 12.2.98 12.7.99 6.28.01 
  
 
Act Promulgated 12.28.98 12.31.99 7.24.01 
  
        
    1st  2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Securities Submitted 8.23.97 2.9.98 4.29.98 12.2.98 11.22.99 12.21.00 
& Exchange Passed 12.29.97 2.14.98 5.15.98 12.29.98 12.16.99 2.28.01 
Act Promulgated 1.8.98 2.24.98 5.25.98 2.1.99 1.21.00 3.28.01 
Table 1.9 shows the result of the improvement of the financial structure of 23 
Chaebols included in the top 30 Chaebols in 1999 and 2000 consecutively. The total  
 
Table 1.9 Financial Status of Chaebols 
(Unit: trillion won, %) 
    Equity(A) Debt(B) (B/A) 
1st-30th Chaeblos 1998 79.2 287.3 363.2 
 1999 141.9 232.9 164.1 
 change 62.7 -54.4 -199.1 
1st-4th Chaebols 1998 53.1 174.6 328.8 
 1999 96.5 141.2 146.3 
  change 43.4 -33.4 -182.5 
5th-30th Chaebols 1998 26.1 112.7 433.4 
 1999 45.4 91.7 201.9 
  change 19.3 -21 -231.5 
Source: Fair Trade Commission 
capital of all these companies increased, and the total debt decreased. As a result, the 
debt ratio for groups ranked 1st to 30th decreased by 199.1 points, for the top 4 
Chaebols by 182.5 points, and for groups ranked 5th to 30th by 231.5 points. 
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Along with these '5 plus 3 rules', efforts to improve corporate governance 
continued. The gist of the Chaebol reform was to reinforce the rights of shareholders, 
and eradicate debt guarantees among the affiliates within a Chaebol. To reinforce the 
rights of shareholders, the conditions for the exercise of shareholder rights were eased 
continuously as shown in Table 1.10. For example, the first row shows that the 
Commercial Act required 5% of shares to exercise derivative suit before December 
1998 and lowered the minimum required shares to 1% in December 1998. It changed 
again to 0.5% if a firm has assets more than a trillion won in April 1999. The 
Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) regulates the listed companies both on the KSE 
and the KOSDAQ, while the Commercial Act regulates all companies. Thus, for the 
listed companies the SEA changed the minimum required shares to 0.5% in February 
1998 and to 0.01% in May 1998. 
 
Table 1.10 The Minimum % of Shares to Exercise Shareholder Rights 
(Unit: %) 
  The Commercial Act The SEA 
Shareholders' Right before  Dec. 1998 Apr. 1999 Feb. 1998 May. 1998 
Derivative suit 5 1 1(0.5) 0.05 0.01 
Right to Injunction 5 1 1(0.5) 0.5(0.25) 0.5(0.25) 
Proposal Right _ 3 1(0.5) 1(0.5) 1(0.5) 
Right to Demand a Removal of Directors, 
Auditors, or Liquidator of the Company 5 3 1(0.5) 0.5(0.25) 0.5(0.25) 
Right to Demand Extra Meeting of 
Stockholders 5 3 3(0.5) 3(1.5) 3(1.5) 
Right to Inspection of Accounting Book 5 3 3(0.5) 1(0.5) 1(0.5) 
Right to Inspection of Business and Financial 
Status of the Company 5 3 3(0.5) 3(1.5) 3(1.5) 
Right to Request of Dissolution of the Company _ _ 10 _ _ 
Numbers in ( ) are for the firms which have assets more than a trillion won 
SEA: Securities and Exchange Act 
Source: KDI  
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In 2000 Korea overcame the economic crisis and began to restore stability. In the 
business sector, the sluggish investment of enterprises began to be recognized as a 
new problem, and the structure of the Chaebols was weakened due to the increased 
inflow of foreign capital following the amendment of related laws and regulations and 
continued Chaebol reform policies. Figure 1.2 and 1.3 below represent the GDP 
growth rate10 before and after the crisis and investment respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 GDP Growth Rate 
Source: KDI Report 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Denominated in won. 
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Figure 1.3 Change in the Rate of Investment 
Source: KDI Report 2007 
 
 
Prior to the crisis, the financial health or corporate governance of the Chaebols 
was treated as problematic. Nevertheless, as they could raise required funds by 
borrowing from banks, the level of responsibility for management failure through the 
market mechanism was low, but the reforms following the crisis alleviated this 
problem. As the possibility of hostile takeovers by foreign companies was now open, 
failed CEOs found it hard to maintain their right of management, and as the economic 
systems favorable to the Chaebols were changed after the Asian financial crisis, the 
Chaebols became less likely to continuously grow while maintaining the form of 
family businesses. In addition, as the transparency of business management was 
emphasized, the Chaebols were required to prepare consolidated financial statements, 
`Accounting Standards' were revised in compliance with international standards, and 
listed corporations were required to appoint nonexecutive (outside) directors. To 
reinforce the responsibility of the controlling shareholder, a new clause was added to 
 14 
consider those who act as directors to be directors regardless of their holding the title 
of director, and to hold them responsible. 
As examined above, the financial crisis in Korea accelerated the liberalization and 
opening of the Korean economy, and seen from the perspective of corporate 
governance, Anglo-American corporate governance was benchmarked, several legal 
systems related to corporate governance were improved, and there was a considerable 
level of change. The following sections will examine the literature related to corporate 
governance, and the changes in the legal systems related to corporate governance in 
Korea. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUE IN KOREA 
 
Abstract 
In Korea, corporate governance has been a controversial issue for the last ten years. 
The Korean government and the International Monetary Fund agreed that some 
specific corporate governance structures in Korea, like the Chaebols, aggravated the 
negative effects of the Asian financial crisis. Thus the government passed a series of 
laws and created institutions to improve corporate governance. This chapter examines 
how corporate governance affects firm value using Korean market data after the Asian 
financial crisis. One core empirical problem in this kind of study is how to deal with 
the endogeneity problem since corporate governance is an endogenous variable which 
firms can choose to increase their value.  We consider the Asian crisis as a natural 
experiment and analyze the effect of changes in the laws regulating corporate 
governance on firm value. The results show that the reform of corporate governance 
led to positive abnormal returns. 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is a mechanism for controlling and monitoring a corporation. 
It is a popularly debated issue in academic, corporate management, and political 
forums. Ownership structure, which is a different concept than corporate governance, 
usually means how the company's shares are distributed. As ownership is dispersed in 
most advanced corporations in modern times and ownership structure is different from 
management control, the issue of corporate governance becomes important. 
Shareholders provide equity capital to the corporation, and the management of the 
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corporation is delegated to professional management, therefore the issue of 
management control is about the power of representation which comes from the 
separation of ownership and control. As shareholders are residual claimers, they need 
mechanisms to supervise the management of the company to represent the interests of 
shareholders who do not participate in the management of the company directly, and 
these mechanisms are called corporate governance. 
In Korea the issue of corporate governance has been constantly raised together 
with the issue of reforming the unique type of conglomerate called `Chaebols'. A 
typical Cahebol consists of many diversified and legally independent affiliates, all of 
which are controlled by a controlling shareholder family.11 It is true that the Chaebols 
have played a positive role in the growth of the Korean economy, which was 
devastated by the Korean War in 1950, through the exercise of their powers together 
with aggressive investments and prompt decisions by the founder or his family 
members of the conglomerate in the early days of growth of the Korean economy. The 
current environment for corporations and the economy, however, has significantly 
changed as compared to the beginning stages of economic growth in the 1960s--1970s. 
Now there is fierce global competition for survival among corporations. In this 
extremely competitive business environment, the time has come to establish sound 
corporate governance in corporations; otherwise it will be very difficult for them even 
to survive. 
Discussions about corporate governance in Korea, including government policies 
toward it, are somewhat different from those in general analyses often pertaining to 
other countries such as the U.S. Whereas discussions on corporate governance in 
general are focused on the reduction of the power of representation of management in 
                                                 
11
 Hwang and Seo (2000) 
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corporations where ownership is decentralized, in the case of Korea, the discussions 
are more concentrated on the power of representation by controlling shareholders at a 
group level rather than the power of representation by professional management in the 
case of stand-alone corporations. The reason why we pay special attention to the 
Chaebols in this discussion on corporate governance is because of the emergence of 
controlling minority shareholders.12 
It is very common in Korea that the founder of a Chaebol or his family actually 
holds the management right on corporation, but there are many instances where the 
ratio of the shareholding by the founder, including his family, is not so high,13 which 
means that the founder and/or his family exercises more management of the 
corporation than the level of their ownership. As they hold equity, their interests 
pursuant to the exercise of governance rights will coincide with that of other 
shareholders as compared to the interest of professional management,14 but they can 
pursue private benefits through the exercise of their governance rights while bearing 
less of the relevant risks. Therefore, in cases where the private benefit which is 
expected from the exercise of their governance right is bigger than the anticipated 
disadvantage due to ownership, they can influence a decision in their favor and 
interest at the expense of other shareholders taking the risk of a reduction in the value 
of the corporation by the decision.15 
When the Asian financial crisis hit many Asian countries in the late 1990s, South 
Korea was one of the most affected ones. On December 3, 1997, the Korean 
government had no choice but to accept an IMF relief loan to solve the extreme 
shortage of foreign exchange liquidity and simultaneously the Korean market was 
                                                 
12
 How this is possible is explained later in this paper. 
13
 Shown in Figure 3.3 
14
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
15
 Bebchuk et al. (2000) 
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opened full scale, which led to a situation where Korean corporations had to face 
merciless international competition. The government recognized the problem of a 
Chaebol-centered national economy and thus concentrated on implementing a legal 
and institutional framework particularly focusing on the improvement of corporate 
governance of Chaebols. After the crisis, corporate governance in Korea improved 
remarkably, although it still needs further improvement. 
Then, the next question will be what constitutes "good" or positive corporate 
governance. One answer to this could be found in the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) Principles of Corporate Governance. The 
representatives of twenty-nine OECD member countries passed the OECD Principles 
unanimously in May 1999.16 Since then, these principles have been accepted as a 
model for corporate governance by global enterprises and investors. According to 
these principles, the corporate objective is to maximize return to its shareholders and 
to achieve long-term prosperity of the business. In order to accomplish this objective, 
these principles delineate various obligations and rights such as public announcement, 
transparency, audit, ownership and responsibilities of shareholders, and the obligations 
and rights of the board of directors. However, one might question whether this kind of 
uniform regulatory guidelines, which does not consider the characteristics of 
individual corporations, can be beneficial to all corporations regardless of their 
individually different situations. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) pointed out this possibility and reported their 
results that suggest that some provisions are detrimental to small firms while 
beneficial to large firms. They analyzed the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and various amendments to the regulations on stock exchanges. One of their main 
findings is that large less compliant firms earned positive abnormal returns, but small 
                                                 
16
 The Principles were revised in 2004 again. 
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less compliant firms earned negative abnormal returns after the rules were announced. 
Lately this possibility has drawn some scholars' attention in Korea. 
The purpose of this chapter is to see whether some of these provisions could harm 
a specific group of firms which have the same characteristics. We divided our sample 
into two groups, firms in a Chaebol and firms not in a Chaebol, and large firms and 
small firms. Then we conduct the same analysis twice, one for each group. 
Section 2 introduces related literature about corporate governance. Section 3 
demonstrates the unique corporate governance environment in Korea. Section 4 
summarizes the corporate governance reforms in Korea since the crisis. Section 5 
mentions an alternative view of corporate governance. Section 6 explains our 
methodology and describes our data. Section 7 reports the results, and Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Interest in and research on corporate governance spread across the globe for the 
past 20 years to such an extent that it could be called explosive. The literature cites the 
following reasons for its unprecedented emergence as a global topic. For starters, in 
the U.S. of the 1980s and Europe of the 1990s, takeovers were so prevalent that people 
called it the age of the hostile takeover, and it created arguments between businesses 
trying to defend against hostile takeovers and scholars. Privatization, which started in 
the U.K. and became a worldwide phenomenon, was another reason for the increased 
interest in corporate governance along with the attempt to pursue shareholder 
democracy. Eastern Europe was deregulated, foreign investment rose due to the capital 
market consolidation of the European Union, and thus interest in corporate governance 
increased for the purpose of protection. Also, the scandals of major American 
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corporations, as exemplified by the Enron scandal and others, were also a reason for 
the increased interest in corporate governance.17 On top of these worldwide trends, the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 in Korea sparked an unprecedented level of interest in 
corporate governance in various sectors of society. The domestic and overseas 
consensus that weak corporate governance, such as the weak investor protection in the 
emerging markets, further aggravated the financial crisis and prompted government, 
business, and academia to engage in several tasks to realize desirable corporate 
governance. 
The basic framework of this corporate governance theory is the agent (manager) 
and principal (shareholder) framework. Berle and Means 1932,18 called a classic in 
corporate governance, construed an enterprise as the relationship between a 
controlling manager and minority shareholders with innumerably distributed 
ownership. It was quite a natural assumption in the U.S. as many canal and railroad 
construction projects were actively carried out in those days.19 Thus their research 
stimulated managerialism in the 1970s. However, things have changed since. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) who led the development of modern corporate finance 
consider firms that have not a dispersed ownership but a concentrated one. They 
focused on the relationship between upper-level management and shareholders. Their 
main thrust is in explaining the ownership structure of the firm as an institution 
designed to limit agency costs. Grossman and Hart (1988) provided the sufficient 
conditions for the one-share-one-vote rule to be optimal when appointing management, 
which is the most efficient way to avoid the agency problem. Harris and Raviv (1988) 
showed that the one-share-one-vote rule is socially optimal. For the last two decades, 
many empirical works have tried testing their arguments. La Porta et al. (1999) studied 
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 Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002), Corporate Goverance and Control 
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 The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
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 Learmount (2002), Corporate Governance 
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30 companies for each of 27 countries to test if companies have the Berle and Means 
ownership structure and report that there are many companies which do not have a 
completely dispersed ownership structure.20 One of their findings says that Germany 
and Austria are the countries which have the highest percentages, 20% and 15% 
respectively, of cross-shareholding among subsidiaries in their samples. Later, 
Claessens et al. (2000) utilize the data of 2,980 firms in 9 East Asian countries and 
report their ownership structure. These empirical papers showed that there existed 
significant ownership concentration in developed countries21 and even more 
concentration in developing countries. 
Since the Asian crisis, many economists have studied Korean corporate 
governance. Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) studied the Korean economy during the 
crisis and reported that firms with high external ownership concentration experienced 
a smaller reduction in share values. Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) constructed a 
corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) using survey data for 515 Korean 
companies based on a 2001 KSE survey and report strong evidence that shows this 
index plays an important role in determining the firm value. 
 
3. The Corporate Governance Environment in Korea 
Corporate governance in Korea has significantly changed in its systematic as well 
as substantial aspects since the Asian crisis. Before the crisis, external shareholders' 
actual participation in the management of a corporation was difficult due to the 
constraints on the shareholders' rights. Also corporations procured the necessary 
operating funds of the corporation through indirect financing instead of issuing of 
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 They used the term, Berle and Means Corporation, to indicate the firms which have a completely 
dispersed ownership structure. 
21
 Edwards and Fischer (1994) 
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shares in the stock market. Therefore it was not so meaningful to properly cope with 
corporate governance problems to raise funds on the stock exchange. Also the 
management of the corporation focused more on the expansion of their line of 
business and the size of the corporation through investments in new businesses rather 
than returning the profit of the corporation to shareholders as dividends. The board of 
directors, which consists of the officers of the company, is not an organization which 
can actually make reasonable resolutions but it serves the function only of confirming 
the decisions of the management of the company. As there is no threatening element to 
the management’s control due to the legal prohibition against holding a large quantity 
of shares, there has been no means to regulate the management of the company and 
corporate performance by the market or the board of directors. Moreover, transparency 
of management and the protection level for investors was quite poor. 
Given this situation before the crisis, the improvement of corporate governance 
was necessary not only from a political but also from a strategic dimension for the 
survival of corporations. Considering the fact that discussions on corporate 
governance were very active in the 80s in the U. S. and in mid-90s in OECD, it is 
believed that the recognition of the importance of corporate governance in Korea is 
rather late. Regardless of whether there was to be autonomous improvement or 
heteronomous improvement due to the financial crisis, it was inevitable that Korea had 
no alternative but to implement the IMF Guidelines such as the enhancement of 
management transparency, reinforcement of shareholders' rights, reinforcement of 
responsibilities of directors and management of the corporation, and activation of a 
governance market. Korea has certainly made considerable progress over the last 10 
years.22 
                                                 
22
 Hwang (1999) 
 24 
As stated above, the Chaebols' governance structure, especially the ownership-
control disparity, has been considered to be one of the most problematic aspects of the 
Korean economy. Ordinarily, the issue of corporate governance stems from the fact 
that the manager has all the decision-making power (agency) and the owner has none, 
but as the controlling shareholders own the right of management in many `Chaebols,' 
the controlling shareholders have controlling power (agency) whereas the external 
shareholders have none. If the controlling shareholders control the company in 
proportion to their ownership, and own the cash-flow rights, agency between them is 
not likely to become a problem, but ordinarily controlling shareholders exercise 
greater control than in proportion to their ownership through circular equity 
investment and/or pyramid equity investment. Figure 2.1 illustrates how a small 
portion of equities can exercise large control in this equity investment structure. 
 
Figure 2.1 Cross Financing and Pyramid Structure (Chang 2003) 
Numbers in ( ) are the value of the firms. 
 
Suppose that a business group consists of three main subsidiaries A, B, and C, 
each of which has $10 billion in assets, and four subsidiaries, D,E,F, and G, which 
 25 
have $10 billion, $20 billion, $20 billion, and $10 billion respectively in assets. The 
controlling shareholder owns 10% of the value of subsidiaries A, B, and C. There is a 
circular investment structure which illustrates that A owns 20% of shares of B, B owns 
20% of shares of C, and C owns 20% of shares of A. Thus, these three firms can 
inflate assets without any additional net inflow. The controlling shareholder, who has 
only 10% of shares of each subsidiary, owns 30% of shares of A, B, and C and is able 
to control the three firms if they have dispersed ownership structure. For the same 
reason, the controlling shareholder can control the four small firms. As a consequence, 
the shareholder has control of the whole business group with only 8.3%23 of shares. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Samsung Group in 2006 
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 [The controlling shareholder's investment/The total investment]*100=[$3 billion/$36 
billion]*100=0.083 
Source: Kang, Bin, Cho, and Yoon (2007) 
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Figure 2.2 demonstrates the real corporate ownership structure and governance 
structure of Samsung group, one of the biggest Chaebols in Korea.24 The figure shows 
only major affiliates out of 5925 in the Samsung Group. Nevertheless, the ownership 
and corporate governance have a complex form, i.e. the pyramid equity investment 
based on the circular financing between affiliates. Affiliates belonging to the group are 
entangled in the complex ownership and corporate governance through equity 
investment in affiliates. The numbers in the figure indicate their shares in the affiliates, 
and the controlling shareholders are the controlling shareholder, the relatives of the 
controlling shareholder, group executives, and nonprofit corporations. This figure is 
recited from the figure included in Kang, Bin, Cho, and Yoon (2007) based on the data 
released by the Fair Trade Commission in 2006. The Fair Trade Act is regulating 
equity investment in affiliates through the rule of the ceiling on the total amount of 
shareholding of other domestic companies, based on the assumption that equity 
investment in affiliates is the cause of ownership-control disparity. Bebchuk et al. 
(2000) reported that ownership-control disparity strengthens the control of the 
controlling shareholder more than their ownership so that it effectively weakens the 
market regulation of controlling shareholders, particularly, the regulation from the 
market for corporate control.26 
The following Figure 2.3 shows the ownership structure of the Chaebols which 
have a controlling shareholder and are one of the top 30 firms. The average percentage 
of shares which the controlling shareholder's family has is about 11% and the 
percentage of shares which the controlling shareholder has is about 3.7%. In contrast 
the Chaebols' affiliates own more than 50% of shares. Thus it is possible for the 
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minority controlling shareholder to control the company through the shares of the 
affiliates. 
 
Figure 2.3 Ownership Distribution 
 
4. Corporate Governance Reform in Korea 
The efforts to improve corporate governance in Korea took the form of the 
government-led amendment of relevant laws and regulations in the years following the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. The Commercial Act was amended three times with 
respect to corporate governance. As the need to cope with the Asian financial crisis 
and to restructure the economy rationally emerged, the Commercial Act was amended 
in 1998 for the purpose of simplifying the merger process and introducing the 
corporate division system in a bid to help corporate restructuring. It also reinforced the 
rights of minority shareholders and introduced the cumulative voting system in an 
Source: Kang, Bin, Cho, and Yoon (2007) 
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effort to monitor management activities, and reinforced the responsibilities of CEOs 
and guaranteed the transparency of management. As globalization increased in the age 
of global competition, the Commercial Act was amended in 1999 in order to reinforce 
the function and role of the board of directors to improve the efficiency of corporate 
management, and it introduced the audit committee system to guarantee the 
transparency of business management and improved the method of operating the 
general meeting of shareholders and the board of directors. This amendment was 
intended to promote sound corporate development and ultimately reinforce the global 
competitiveness of enterprises by improving corporate governance. The Commercial 
Act was amended in July 2001 to expand the scope of the resolutions made by the 
general meeting of shareholders, improve the board of directors system and reinforce 
the right of shareholders' preemptive rights in order to enhance the transparency of 
business management and reinforce global competitiveness. The purpose was to 
improve corporate governance and introduce the stock swap and transfer system for 
the establishment of holding companies to support corporate restructuring. 
The corporate governance reforms after the Asian crisis can be largely divided into 
three parts: the reinforcement of an internal control system, the reinforcement of an 
external control system, an audit system, and creation of more transparency of 
corporate management through the disclosure system. 
Regarding the internal control system, the role of outside directors in leading to 
reasonable resolutions of the board of directors was emphasized. As the criticism 
mounted in early 1998 immediately after the Asian financial crisis to the effect that the 
inability of the board of directors to oversee management resulted in insolvent 
operations, the government introduced the outside director system to ensure that 
outside directors play a leading role in the decision-making process of the board of 
directors so as to enhance the fairness and transparency of corporate management. The 
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intrinsic function of the board of directors is to appoint management, and make 
corporate decisions about the conduct of business, and oversee and supervise the 
conduct of business. However, the CEO, the controlling shareholder, holds sway over 
the board of directors and manages the company in an autocratic manner, thereby 
greatly detracting from the interests of ordinary shareholders. The non-executive 
director system allows outside directors independent of management to participate in 
the board of directors, the decision-making body of the corporation, in order to prevent 
the arbitrariness of the controlling shareholder and thus it performs the duty of internal 
control. 
The election of outside directors was legally required for all listed companies in 
the Korean Stock Exchange. The International Monetary Fund requested a law 
requiring the election of outside directors to enhance the transparency of corporations, 
and in February 1998 all listed corporations in KSE were required to elect outside 
directors for more than one quarter of the total number of registered directors through 
the revision of the Regulation on the Listing of Securities.27 
Also, pursuant to the revised Securities Exchange Act in 2001, the listed 
corporations in the KOSDAQ had the same obligation. Also, the firms which have 
more than 2 trillion won as their assets are required to elect outside directors for more 
than half28 of all the registered directors.29 
There was a separate regulation for listed corporations or financial institution with 
asset sizes of more than 2 trillion won, enacted in 2000 and the regulation stipulated 
that the number of outside directors should be more than 1/2 of the board of directors. 
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 The Regulation on the Listing of Securities, 48-5-1 
28
 Three outside directors is the minimum requirement. Thus, firms should elect at least three outside 
directors even in the case that the half of the number of directors is less than three. 
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 The Exchange and Securities Act, 191-16-1 and the Enforcement Decree of the Exchange and 
Securities Act 84-23-2. The Article 45-5-2 of the Securities Listing Regulation. Refer to Lee and Oh 
(2001) for detailed contents on the legislation of outside directors in "the Revision of the Security 
Listing Regulation" dated February 21, 1998, Korea Securities Exchange. 
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Also the regulation required establishing an Audit Committee which consists of more 
than 2/3 of outside directors including the chairman of the committee. The installation 
of an outside director recommendation committee was legally required and the voting 
rights of major shareholders were limited to less than 3% at the time of election of an 
outside director who is an auditor of the corporation. 
Another important change of the internal control system, in addition to the non-
executive director system, concerns the responsibilities of the largest shareholder. 
Characteristically of the Korean Chaebols, the boss is the largest shareholder and 
actually controls the corporation. The government attempted to get rid of the practice 
of the head of a Chaebol bearing no legal responsibilities for the result of exercising 
absolute influential power over the management of the business group by newly 
enacting the provision on the responsibility of persons involved in work execution 
(Director in fact) in the Commercial Code, and internal control system was reinforced 
by newly enacting the director's duty of loyalty. 
In order to strengthen the right of minority shareholders, this amendment loosened 
the requirements for the exercise of shareholder rights, reinforced the private means of 
remedy for shareholders, and permitted the shares held by trust accounts to exercise 
voting rights. The requirements for the exercise of the rights of minority shareholders 
such as the rights for filing lawsuits for the representative, the right to read company 
records, a cumulative voting system, and a shareholder suggestion system at the time 
of electing directors were newly enacted while also allowing the exercise of proxy 
voting rights for stocks held in trust account by banks and trust companies to enhance 
the role of institutional investors, namely abolishing the shadow voting system. And 
also a series of laws were enacted that lowered the minimum percentage of shares 
required to exercise various shareholder rights such as the right to file an injunction 
with the court barring the directors proposed action, right for dismissal of the director, 
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auditor and liquidator, right to convene an extraordinary general meeting of 
shareholders, right to read the corporation's accounting records, and right to claim for 
an audit of the corporation's work and property state. 
To reinforce the external control system, flexibility of the management market was 
enhanced through the activation of M&A, the obligatory open purchase system was 
abolished to reinforce the control on corporate management, the set-up of exclusive 
M&A funds was allowed, foreigner's stock investment limits were abolished, and the 
requirements for obtaining agreement of the board of directors was lowered. Also, the 
scope of foreigners' investment in the stock markets which needed government’s30 
approval was shrunk. The amount of foreigners' shares which requires the agreement 
of the board of directors was mitigated from 10% to 33%. 
As shown in Table 2.1, the process of opening the capital market in Korea began 
in the early 1990s. On January 3 in 1992, the stock market was partially opened to 
foreign investors. On May 25, 1998, it allowed foreigners to buy any amount of stock 
except in government-owned corporations. There still was a limit on foreigners' stock 
acquisition in government-owned corporations. Foreigners were not allowed to buy 
more than 30% of the stocks. However, foreign investors could acquire the stocks of 
non-government-owned corporations up to 100%. 
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 The Minister of Finance and Economy. In 2008 the Department changed its name to Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance. 
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Table 2.1 Limits on How Much Owned by Foreigners  
(unit: %) 
year 1992 1994 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 1997 1998 
month.day 1 12 7 4 10 5 11 12.1 12.3 5 
by stock                     
non-government-owned 
firms 10 12 15 18 20 23 26 50 55 _ 
government-owned firms 8 8 10 12 15 18 21 25 25 30 
by individual   
non-government-owned 
firms 3 3 3 4 5 6 7 50 50 _ 
government-owned firms 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 
 
In the year 1992, when the securities market was opened, the total market value of 
listed stocks in the KSE was 85 trillion won but in 1999 it was increased to 350 trillion 
won. Foreigners held only 3% of the market value of the listed companies in 1992 as 
shown in Table 2.4. Since then it has increased and it reached 20% of the market value 
(or 12% of the shares) of the listed stocks in 1999. As shown in Figure 2.5, the ratio of 
shares which foreigners own in the KSE in February 2008 is about 32% which has 
decreased by 12% points compared to the ratio in April 2004. However, the market 
values of the stocks foreigners own have increased through 2007 as shown in Figure 
2.5. 
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Figure 2.4 Stocks Owned by Foreigners 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Stocks and Market Value Owned by Foreigners 
 
 
Source: KDI Report 2007 
Source: GCGC Report 
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The following Table 2.2 reports ownership distribution in Korea in 2006. 
 
Table 2.2 Ownership Distribution in 2006 
 
Investors % of Shares 
Foreigners 37.26 
Institutional Investors 21.96 
Company Investors 18.55 
Individual Investors 17.90 
State 4.29 
Source: KSE  
 
The high liability ratio and non-transparent management by the Chaebols 
deteriorated the credit ratings of Korean corporations in the international financing 
market, and after the crisis, the deteriorated rating served as a factor for the collection 
of financings and investments by international financial institutions and foreign 
investors. The government implemented market-centered reformation to enhance 
management transparency and corporate governance by the Chaebols by imposing an 
obligation to prepare combined financial statements for large-size conglomerates. 
Unlike the consolidated financial statements which include the financial data of the 
subsidiaries only, the combined financial statements must include the financial data 
for all the affiliates in the business group which are in fact controlled by the head of 
the Chaebol. 
The scope of the business groups under control changed little by little, depending 
on the relevant government regulations over the years. Prior to 2003, 30 business 
groups referred to the top 30 business groups announced by the Fair Trade 
Commission each year, but afterwards the Commission classified business groups into 
those groups for whom cross-shareholding is restricted, those groups subject to the 
ceiling on the total amount of shareholding of other domestic companies, and those 
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groups for whom guarantee of obligations is limited. The conglomerates subject to the 
combined financial statement includes all domestic affiliates and overseas affiliates 
which belong to the conglomerate as of the basis date for the preparation of the 
combined financial statements. In the combined financial statements, investor's equity 
as well as investee's equity among affiliates must be announced publicly as the status 
of mutual equity investment among affiliates within the same conglomerate group. 
In accordance with international accounting standards, the corporate accounting 
standard was revised and the government's supervision of the accounting audit was 
reinforced so that a corporation's management situation and risk level are exposed to 
market evaluation. In December 1998, in order to get rid of distrust of domestic 
corporation's financial statements, the local corporate accounting standard was 
significantly revised based on international accounting standard and the American 
accounting standard. These changes included expansion of valuation of present value 
of credit and liabilities, prohibition of profit manipulation through accounting changes, 
clarification of accounting treatment of derivative products and reinforcement of 
public announcement on the notes. In order to minimize the possibility of fraudulent 
accounting, a group lawsuit for external auditors was allowed, the relevant penalty 
was adjusted upward, an internal accounting control system was introduced, the laws 
related to the advancement of the accounting system was revised in 2003, and CEO's 
and CFO's obligations to certify the announced financial documents were intensified 
while reinforcing the independence of audit by accounting firms and restricting the 
consulting business of accounting firms. The Korea Securities Supervisory Service 
also adopted the fair public announcement system of America Securities Supervisory 
Board and implemented a fair public announcement system from December 2002. In 
April 1998, reciprocal guarantees between affiliates which belong to the same Chaebol 
were prohibited. 
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5. An Alternative View of Corporate Governance 
As examined above, considering the situation prior to the Asian financial crisis, 
the internal and external call on the improvement of corporate governance was 
inevitable. As a result of the measures taken, the corporate governance of Korean 
companies during the past decade made considerable progress both in appearance and 
substance. However, there are differing opinions as to whether the degree and 
direction of government intervention to affect this progress was desirable. In recent 
years the academic community has begun to rethink whether these policies were 
beneficial and appropriate by taking into consideration the political and historical 
environment of Korean companies. 
First of all, what the IMF and the Korean government took to be "desirable" 
corporate governance is itself based on Anglo-American corporate governance 
practices. The Anglo-American corporate governance practices involve widely 
dispersed stock ownership, corporate governance by professional managers, 
reinvigoration of the market for corporate control, and types of corporations whose 
primary objectives are higher stock prices and increased amounts of dividends. This 
type of corporate governance dominates the market in the U.S. and the U.K. However, 
most European countries31 and Asian countries,32 including Japan, have a different 
type of corporate governance.33 Recently many scholars in Korea, who have evaluated 
the decade in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, are asking whether Korea should 
                                                 
31
 In many European countries, the role of the board of directors has not been stated in law and 
shareholder utility maximization is not the only goal of the board of directors. The legal system in 
Germany and Austria requires balancing the rights of shareholders and employees (stakeholders). 
32
 In most Asian countries, the level of shareholder protection is low and large business groups are 
prevalent. 
33
 La Porta et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (2000) 
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blindly follow only the Anglo-American corporate governance practices and whether 
they are optimal for Korean corporations. 
The difference in corporate governance between different countries essentially 
stems from the difference in ownership structure and reflects the political and 
historical differences in how the companies were formed. Some in academic circles 
believe that there is desirable corporate governance common to all companies and 
view the Anglo-American practices as such. They propose a convergence theory and 
argue that all corporations adhere to these practices. On the other hand, others 
advocate alternative theories, such as the path-dependence theory, and the political 
dynamics and historicity theory, that is, that corporate governance is the result of 
reflecting the different political and historical environments of individual countries 
and coping with it. 
Kraakman et al. (2004) argue that corporate governance can be divided into four 
kinds. The first is the manager-oriented model which can be seen in the U.S. and the 
U.K. supported by Berle and Means (1932). The second type of corporate governance 
is the labor-oriented model in Germany. The third and fourth types are the state-
oriented model in Asia and the stakeholder-oriented model respectively. They also 
argue that these different governance structures are converging to the shareholder-
oriented model.34 
Over 10 years have passed since the crisis. Now Korean academics are taking 
interest in these alternative theories because of several problems that have come to 
light over the years. Recall that the belated awakening to the importance of corporate 
governance was attributed to the problems with the corporate governance of the 
Chaebols. Korea attempted to solve these problems by replacing this governance with 
Anglo-American practices. However, internal corporate governance and strategic 
                                                 
34
 This type of corporate governance is prevalent in the U.S. and the U.K. 
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decision-making was not based on coordination of interests of stakeholders to suit the 
environment facing each company. Rather, the government directly intervened and 
enforced uniform regulation on the Chaebols. In actuality, it might have been more 
desirable if this improvement of corporate governance and securing of management 
transparency had avoided dependence on government regulation, and had been based 
on the coordination of the interests of market participants. 
A few studies35 have pointed out the problems of uniform regulation by examining 
equipment investment rates. Shin (2005) reports that equipment investment rates 
exceeded the economic growth rates prior to the Asian financial crisis, and this 
investment served as the driving force behind the growth of the Korean economy. 
However, the annual growth rate of corporate investment has dropped to less than 3% 
since 2001, far less than the economic growth rate of 4.5% between 2001 and 2005. 
He attributes this drop in the corporate investment to the change in corporate 
governance. 
More recently, Sovereign's attack on SK in 2003, Hermes' attack on Samsung 
C&T in 2004, and Icahn's attack on KT&G in 2006 amplified the domestic interest in 
the market for corporate control, and directly sparked discussion of hostile takeovers. 
As it was impossible to take over the right of management in Korea before the Asian 
financial crisis due to the rule which regulated the upper level of shares that foreigners 
could own, no defense mechanism against hostile takeovers was necessary. However, 
the obligatory takeover bid system and the ceiling on foreign investment were 
abolished in the post-IMF improvement process. As shown in Figure 2.4, the 
percentage of shares which foreigners own has been rapidly increasing since 1998. 
Also, Table 2.3 represents the percentage of shares of individual companies foreigners 
own as of May 2008. 
                                                 
35
 Jinyoung Shin (2005), Kiseok Hong (2006) 
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Table 2.3 Percentages of Shares Owned by Foreigners in May 2008 
 
Ranking Company % of Shares 
1 Namyang Dairy 98.27 
4 Korea Exchange Bank 81.25 
5 Samsung (P) 80.61 
6 SK (P) 80.57 
8 Kukmin Bank 79.06 
11 Hyundai Auto (P) 74.48 
12 LG Electronics (P) 74.09 
15 Hite Brewery 70.79 
17 Ssangyong 69.63 
19 Samsung Fire Insurance (P) 67.00 
22 SK Energy (P) 64.15 
24 Amore Pacific (P) 63.81 
40 Samsung Fire Insurance  54.64 
42 KT&G 53.26 
50 SK Telecom 48.60 
52 S-Oil 47.97 
58 POSCO 46.52 
59 KT 46.42 
60 Samsung Electronics 46.07 
Source: Yahoo Finance in May 2008  
(P) means preferred stocks  
 
As a result, the market for hostile takeovers of Korean companies is completely 
open, and there is no means of defending against such threats to the right of 
management. Corporations find themselves busy defending their right of management 
by repurchasing shares or swapping equities with friendly companies. Consequently, 
stock repurchases and cash dividends have increased rapidly, as shown in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 Changes in Dividend Policy and Repurchase 
(unit: million won) 
  Repurchase   Dividend 
2005 1950.2 2002 5884.6 
2006 5333.4 2004 10140.9 
2007 4620.2 2006 11692.2 
Source: KSE 
Thus, these days business circles are demanding reforms that would enable 
companies to defend themselves against hostile takeovers since the money for 
investment being spent on stock repurchase and dividends is weakening the growth 
potential of the firms. As shown in Table 2.5, many other countries allow hostile 
takeovers but also permit corporations to take defensive measures at the same time. In 
contrast, Korea allows hardly any of these defense mechanisms, although discussions 
are now underway to find ways to permit such defense mechanisms. However, some36 
argue that it will be hard for the Chaebols to defend against hostile takeovers 
considering their ownership structure37 even if these mechanisms were allowed. In 
addition to this they insist that these proposed anti-takeover mechanisms are 
unnecessary because there has not been yet an actual hostile takeover case in Korea. 
 
Table 2.5 Anti-Takeover Mechanisms 
  U.S.A. Japan France Korea 
Report on Mass Holding of Stocks Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Golden Share No Yes Yes No 
Poison Pill Yes Yes Yes No 
Additional Voting Right Yes Yes Yes No 
Mandatory Tender Offer No No Yes No 
Regulation on the Foreign Investment Yes Yes Yes Yes/No 
Source: The Federation of Korean Industries    
                                                 
36
 KDI Report (2007) and Shin (2005) 
37
 The average ownership ratio of controlling shareholders ia about 3.5%. So it is not likely for them to 
protect their control power against hostile takeover even though some of the mechanisms allowed. 
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6. Methodology and Data 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the impact of the reform of corporate 
governance on stock returns. The biggest problem in studying the impact of corporate 
governance structure change on firm value is that governance structure is an 
endogenous variable which corporations can choose. In other words, as corporations 
can choose governance structure to improve their firm value, it is difficult to derive 
any meaningful conclusion only on the basis of firm value and governance structure. 
However, the change in governance structure in Korea in the late 1990s was legally 
enforced by the government, and was not of their own accord. Accordingly, it should 
be possible to view the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment and arrive at a 
meaningful conclusion. 
As stated above, the Korean government and the IMF initiated the reform of 
corporate governance after the Asian crisis, and the reform focused on business groups 
called Chaebols. This chapter examines whether the reform of corporate governance 
had a greater impact on firms in business groups than those not in business groups. In 
addition to this, the empirical model examines the impact of the introduction of the 
outside director system. 
This study measures the announcement effect of the laws and ordinances related to 
improvement of corporate governance. What makes it different than the standard event 
study method is that the event period is longer since the laws and ordinances were not 
promulgated and enforced at one time, but over years, especially in 1998 and 1999. 
Also, there is another reason that the standard event study method does not work. The 
change in corporate governance rules is not a firm-specific event but a event which 
can affect the whole market at the announcement time. Therefore, it is hard to assume 
that one firm's return would not be affected by another firm's return at the same time t. 
 42 
In other words, the covariances of the returns across firms are not zero. Thus, this 
clustering problem should be considered. In this chapter, to take care of these 
problems, we adopted the portfolio approach which is recommended by Campbell, Lo, 
and MacKinlay (1997).38 This method is to group firms under consideration into 
portfolios. Thus, we calculate the return of portfolio, P as follows: 
 
 
 
 is the return for the group p portfolio from t-1 to t. i stands for a stock which is 
in the portfolio p.  is the number of stocks in the portfolio p at time t. Then, we 
obtain a time series of the equal weighted portfolio returns. The return of each 
interested portfolio is compared with a benchmark return. This is the main 
methodology of Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) and Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2007). Greenstone et al. (2006) report announcement effects of 
disclosure rules and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) examine the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and various amendments related to corporate governance. These 
two studies use the following four factor model to calculate the benchmark return. 
The four factors are the market ( ), size (SMB), value (HML), and 
momentum factors (MOM). The market factor controls the abnormal return related to 
the market abnormal return. The size and value factors are based on Fama and French 
(1993). The momentum factor originated from Carhart (1997). 
                                                 
38
 Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) follows the same method. 
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However, we use the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) as a 
benchmark in this chapter. This model expands on the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) by adding size and value factors in addition to the market risk factor in 
CAPM. This model incorporates the fact that value and small cap stocks outperform 
markets. Fama and French (1993) attempted to make a better model to measure market 
returns and found that value stocks outperform growth stocks and small cap stocks 
tend to outperform large cap stocks. As an asset pricing model, the performance of 
portfolios with a number of small cap and/or value stocks would be lower than the 
CAPM result, as the three-factor model takes into account small cap and value 
outperformance. The reason we use the Fama-French three-factor model is that there 
are many papers39 which report no evidence of the momentum effect in Korean 
exchange. Thus, we do not consider the momentum factor. Suppose we are interested 
in the portfolio, p. Then the Fama-French three-factor model can be written as follows: 
(1) 
 is the equal weighted return of portfolio p at time t.  and  are a risk-free 
interest rate and the market return at time t respectively. The first factor, ( - ) is 
the market factor as in the CAPM. This factor controls for the difference between 
market and risk-free returns. The second and the third factor are the size factor and the 
value factor, respectively, as in Fama and French (1993). The term SMB stands for the 
difference between the two portfolio returns, the return of small firms’ portfolio and 
the return of large firms’ portfolio. The HML is the difference between the two 
portfolio returns, the return of value stocks and growth stocks. The constant term,  
                                                 
39
 Lee and Ahn (2002), Park and Gee (2006), Lee and Kim (2004) 
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is the excess returns, which is specific to the portfolio p which we are interested in. 
One important assumption behind this is that the asset-pricing model is indeed true. If 
we make this assumption, then we can consider the term,  as excess returns.40 
Suppose the change in governance structure has a positive effect on firm value. Then 
we can expect the estimate of the coefficient,  will be significant and positive. 
 
Table 2.6 Ranges for Six Portfolios 
 
The data about firms' returns were downloaded from the KisValue Database,41 and 
market indexes were obtained through Datastream. We used the three-year Korean 
government bond rate as a risk-free interest rate. This was downloaded from the 
database of the Bank of Korea. Market values and book-to-market ratios to calculate 
the two Fama-French factors were obtained from KisValue Database. Professor 
French provided Fama-French factors for some countries on his website. However, 
Fama-French factors of the Korean market are not provided on the webpage. Thus, we 
calculated the factors by the method which Fama and French (1993) suggested. We 
divided stocks into three categories, Value, Neutral, and Growth, by 30th percentile 
and 70th percentile of book-to-market ratio and also divided them into two categories, 
Small and Big, by 50th percentile of the total market value. As shown in Table 2.6, we 
obtained six portfolios and calculated the average returns for each portfolio. Then we 
obtained the two factors by the equation (2). We used daily data. 
                                                 
40
 The literature points out this as a limitation of this method. The results may vary across asset pricing 
models. 
41
 http://www.kisinfo.co.kr/eng 
 45 
 
    SMB  = 1/3(SmallValue+SmallNeutral+SmallGrowth) 
                         -1/3(BigValue+BigNeutral+BigGrowth) 
  HML  = 1/2(SmallValue+BigValue) 
     -1/2(SmallGrowth+BigGrowth)                                    (2) 
 
7. Estimation and the Results 
As shown above, the government carried out a large reform of corporate 
governance of business groups after the Asian financial crisis. This is because the 
government diagnosed the reason for being seriously affected by the financial crisis as 
the poor corporate governance structure in Chaebols. The rules about corporate 
governance were amended several times over the period from 1998 to 2001 as shown 
in Table 1.8 (time line). Thus, it is not easy to segregate the effect of each change of a 
rule. 
The changes in corporate governance regulations is concentrated in the period 
between 1998 and 1999, focusing on improvement of corporate governance of the 
Chaebols. To see how these rule changes differently affect the value of Chaebol firms 
and the value of non-Chaebol firms, we used data in 1998 and 1999 and divided the 
sample into two subsamples, the top-30 Chaebol firms and the non-top-30 Chaebol 
firms. The Fair Trade Commission had announced top 30 business groups every year 
from 1987 until 2001 to regulate them and the government had targeted them in that 
period. We estimate the following relation. Portfolio “p” consists of the top-30 
Chaebol firms in 1998 and portfolio “q” is comprised of the non-top-30 Chaebol firms 
in 1998. 
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The actual estimation is as follows: 
 
The estimates of excess returns are presented in Table 2.7.42 
 
Table 2.7 Estimated Excess Returns (Top 30 Chaebol Firms Dummy) 
 (n=976, Adj. R-Sq=0.64) 
1998-1999 estimate t-value annualized 
α 0.00219*** 3.08 0.55188 
D(Top 30 Firms) 0.01835*** 14.93 4.6116 
 
As stated above, α stands for the abnormal returns. The estimate of α is 0.00219 
with t-value 3.08 in the estimation.43 This means that the excess return of the non-top-
30 Chaebol firms’ portfolio is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Also from the 
estimate of top-30 firm dummy, 0.01835 with t-value 14.93, we know that the excess 
returns of the top-30 Chaebol firms are significantly higher than those of the non-top-
30 Chaebol firms. 44 We also report the annualized excess return of the portfolios. We 
run alternative regression to see the abnormal returns of top-30 Chaebol firms. The 
                                                 
42
 The whole results of the estimation, Y=AX+DBX+ɛ, are reported in the Appendix of this chapter. In 
addition to these, we report another sets of results of an alternative estimation, Y=(1-D)AX+DBX+ ɛ, in 
the Appendix. 
43
 ***, **, * mean that the estimates are significant at the 1, 5, 10 % levels, respectively. 
44
 The annualized excess returns are obtained by [252 trading days per year * estimate]. 
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estimate of excess return of non-top-30 Chaebol firms is 0.020545 and this estimate is 
significant at the 1 % level.46 From the Table 2.7 we can conclude non-top-30 Chaebol 
firms earned positive returns in 1998-1999 and top-30 Chaebol firms earned more 
excess returns in the same period.  
Korea has two main stock exchanges, the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the 
Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ). Most of the changes in 
corporate governance in this period did not differentiate in treatment of the two 
markets in regulating them except the clause about outside directors. The outside 
director system was first introduced in the amendment of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in Korea in February 1998 and it regulated only the listed firms on the 
KSE. After that, it was extended to regulate the listed firms on the KOSDAQ in March 
2001. Paying attention to this fact, we compare the excess returns from the two 
portfolios of firms on the two different stock markets. If having outside directors has a 
positive effect on firm value, then the KSE portfolio return must outperform the 
KOSDAQ portfolio return in 1998. Similarly the KOSDAQ portfolio returns should 
outperform the KSE portfolio returns in 2001. The estimation results are reported in 
Table 2.8. The dummy variable equals one if the firm is in the KOSDAQ portfolio and 
zero otherwise. 
 
 
Table 2.8 Estimated Excess Returns (Firms on the KSE Dummy in 1998) 
(n=480, Adj. R-Sq=0.70) 
1998 estimate t-value annualized 
α -0.000612 -0.79 -0.154224 
D(Firms on the KSE) 0.02082*** 13.27 5.24664 
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 With 20.54 t-value. 
46
 This result comes from the alternative estimation equation, Y=(1-D)AX+DBX+ ɛ and is reported in 
the Appendix. 
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The estimate of α is -0.000612 which is estimated abnormal returns of firms on the 
KOSDAQ in 1998. This estimate is negative, but not significant even at the 10% level. 
However, we know that the estimate of abnormal returns of firms on the KSE in 1998 
is statistically significantly greater than the negative α estimate at the 1% level. From 
the alternative estimation, the estimate of the excess return of the firms on the KSE in 
1998 is 0.0202 with 14.8 t-value. Thus, the portfolio earned positive excess returns in 
1998.  
 
Table 2.9 Estimated Excess Returns (Firms on the KOSDAQ Dummy in 2000) 
(n=486, Adj. R-Sq=0.76) 
2001 estimate t-value annualized 
α 0.002195*** 2.85 0.55188 
D(Firms on the 
KOSDAQ) 0.010728*** 8.59 2.70144 
 
Table 2.9 shows estimates of abnormal returns of the KSE firm portfolio. The 
estimate is 0.002195 and significant at the 1 % level. From the positive and significant 
estimate of the KOSDAQ dummy coefficient, we know KOSDAQ portfolio 
outperformed the KSE portfolio in 2001. The estimate of the abnormal return of the 
KOSDAQ portfolio, 0.012924 is positive and significant at the 1% level.47  
As shown in Table 2.8 and 2.9, the excess return of the KSE portfolio in 1998 is 
positive and significant at the 1 % level, and the KSE portfolio outperformed the 
KOSDAQ portfolio in 1998. However, the excess return of the KOSDAQ portfolio is 
not significant in 1998. The excess return of the KOSDAQ portfolio in 2001, is 
0.00219 which is positive48 and significant at the 1% level and that of KOSDAQ 
portfolio in 2001 is 0.010728 which is also positive and significant. The positive and 
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 The results are provided in the Appendix of this chapter. 
48
 From the alternative estimation, the estimate of abnormal return of the KOSDAQ portfolio in 2001 is 
1.2924 with 13.15 t-value. Details are in the Appendix of this chapter. 
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significant estimate of abnormal returns of the KOSDAQ portfolio means that the 
KOSDAQ portfolio outperformed the KSE portfolio in 2001. 
We also checked if the uniform regulation affected the firm value of small firms 
differently from large firms. Table 2.10 reports the results. The estimates of the excess 
returns of the small firms’ portfolio and large firms’ portfolio are 0.002045 with 2.9449 
t-value and 0.01801 with t-value 18.47, respectively. However, the estimate of the 
small firms dummy is -0.0122 which means that the small firms’ portfolio 
underperformed the large firm portfolio in 1998-1999. 
 
Table 2.10 Estimated Excess Returns (Small Firms Dummy) 
( n=976, Adj. R-Sq=0.57) 
1998-1999 estimate t-value annualized 
α 0.01801*** 18.47 4.5385 
D (Small Firms) -0.0122*** -10.36 -3.0744 
 
Most of the estimated excess returns are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
which is consistent with our expectations. According to these results, we conclude that 
the reform of corporate governance had a positive effect on firm value. Also, to 
analyze if this reform affected differently firm value depending on firm size, we 
divided the sample in each market into two categories, large firms and small firms, 
and obtained excess returns. The excess return of the small firm portfolio is positive 
and significant at the 1 % level. Thus, we failed to find evidence to show that the 
reform which did not consider firms' characteristics affects negatively the small firms' 
value. 
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 This estimation results are reported in the Appendix. 
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8. Conclusion 
For the last decade, most Korean firms underwent changes of their corporate 
governance structure, and corporate governance rules were changed significantly. As 
internal control systems, the roles of both outside directors and audit committees were 
emphasized. The rights of minority shareholders were strengthened, and to protect 
their rights the corporate governance rules lowered the requirements for them to 
exercise their rights. As an external control system, instead of regulating the top-30 
Chaebols, new rules were introduced like the limitations on debt guarantees, the 
limitations on mutual investment, and the limitations on total investment amount. In 
addition to this, the government reformed the audit system and the disclosure system 
to guarantee transparency of business. 
Most of these changes were made by the government following the IMF 
Guidelines and were movements toward the American style of corporate governance. 
Some economists argue that these changes might negatively affect the value of 
specific kind of firms since the change did not take account of political and historical 
aspects of Korean corporations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test whether there was a positive impact of 
governance rule changes. Another purpose is to ask if there were differential impacts, 
where non-Chaebols or small firms were disadvantaged by these rules, taking the 
financial crisis in 1997 as a natural experiment. We find that non-Chaebol firms also 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns from these policy changes and that 
there is no evidence that small firms had negative abnormal returns. Small firms 
obtained statistically significant positive abnormal returns. The results show us that 
the reform of corporate governance significantly increased firm value, especially top-
30 Chaebol firms, in 1998 and 1999. We found no evidence to support the hypothesis 
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that the uniform changes negatively affected the value of non-Chaebol firms and small 
firms. Introduction of the outside director system has a positive impact on firm value. 
In the year when the system was introduced in the KSE, the KSE portfolio 
outperformed the KOSDAQ portfolio, but the KOSDAQ portfolio outperformed the 
KSE portfolio in 2001 when the system was introduced in the KOSDAQ. 
Since the study in this chapter is based on the listed firms as of 2007 in the KSE 
and KOSDAQ, due to data availability, this has its own limitation. Another limitation 
of this study is caused by using only the firms which survived until 2007. If non-listed 
firms or firms that have disappeared, since 1997 were included in this study, the 
results might be different from those reported above. 
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APPENDIX 
The Results of the Estimation of the Abnormal Returns: Y=AX+BX+ɛ 
 
A.1 Estimation Results of the Model with Top-30 Chaebol Firm Dummy in 1998-
1999 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Intercept 0.00219 3.08 
D(Chaebol) 0.01832 14.93 
Rm-Rf -0.58233 -19.5 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.09425 -2.37 
SMB 0.00427 6.18 
D(SMB) -0.00455 -4.75 
HML 0.00002 0.04 
D(HML) 0.00537 7.1 
 
 
A.2  Estimation Results of the Model with KSE Firm Dummy in 1998 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Intercept -0.00061 -0.79 
D(KSE) 0.02082 13.27 
Rm-Rf -0.04791 -1.31 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.47061 -9.65 
SMB 0.00137 1.51 
D(SMB) 0.00155 1.25 
HML 0.00007 0.08 
D(HML) 0.01076 8.75 
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A.3 Estimation Results of the Model with KOSDAQ Firm Dummy in 2001 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Intercept 0.00219 2.85 
D(KOSDAQ) 0.01072 8.59 
Rm-Rf -0.75701 -19.42 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.04839 -0.88 
SMB 0.00678 6.93 
D(SMB) 0.00314 2.27 
HML -0.00066 -1.07 
D(HML) -0.01016 -11.63 
 
 
A.4 Estimation Results of the Model with Small Firm Dummy in 1998-1999 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Intercept 0.01801 18.47 
D(Small ) -0.01596 -13.33 
Rm-Rf -0.57817 -22.53 
D(Rm-Rf) 0.04874 1.26 
SMB 0.00146 2.26 
D(SMB) 0.00359 3.83 
HML 0.004 7.69 
D(HML) -0.0065 -8.79 
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The Results of an Alternative Estimation of the Abnormal Returns:  
Y=(1-D)AX+DBX+ ɛ 
 
B.1 Estimation Results of the Model with Top-30 Chaebol Firm Dummy in 1998-1999 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
D(Chaebol) 0.02052 20.54 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.67659 -25.73 
D(SMB) -0.00027 -0.42 
D(HML) 0.0054 10.13 
(1-D)(Chaebol) 0.00219 3.08 
(1-D)(Rm-Rf) -0.58233 -19.5 
(1-D)(SMB) 0.00427 6.18 
(1-D)(HML) 0.00002 0.04 
 
 
B.2 Estimation Results of the Model with KSE Firm Dummy in 1998 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
D(KSE) 0.0202 14.8 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.51852 -16.15 
D(SMB) 0.00292 3.42 
D(HML) 0.01083 12.51 
(1-D)(KSE) -0.00061 -0.79 
(1-D)(Rm-Rf) -0.04791 -1.31 
(1-D)(SMB) 0.00137 1.51 
(1-D)(HML) 0.00007 0.08 
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B.3 Estimation Results of the Model with KOSDAQ Firm Dummy in 2001 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
D(KOSDAQ) 0.01292 13.15 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.8054 -20.79 
D(SMB) 0.00992 10.15 
D(HML) -0.01083 -17.53 
(1-D)(KOSDAQ) 0.00219 2.85 
(1-D)(Rm-Rf) -0.75701 -19.42 
(1-D)(SMB) 0.00678 6.93 
(1-D)(HML) -0.00066 -1.07 
 
 
B.4 Estimation Results of the Model with Small Firm Dummy in 1998-1999 
 
Variables Estimates t-values 
D(Small) 0.00204 2.94 
D(Rm-Rf) -0.52942 -18.17 
D(SMB) 0.00506 7.49 
D(HML) -0.00249 -4.76 
(1-D)(Small) 0.01801 18.47 
(1-D)(Rm-Rf) -0.57817 -22.53 
(1-D)(SMB) 0.00146 2.26 
(1-D)(HML) 0.004 7.69 
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CHAPTER 3  
ESTIMATION OF UNKNOWN STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF FIRMS IN 
THE KSE 
 
Abstract 
We estimated the dates when firms' structural changes occurred around the Asian 
crisis and test them. We assume that the dates of structural changes are unknown. We 
utilize Hansen's (1997) method to test no structural changes. The proposed results are 
quite different from what are widely believed. 
 
1. Introduction 
The classical test for structural change is the Chow test.50 The test is implemented 
by dividing the whole sample into two sub-groups, estimating separately and 
comparing the two estimation results from the two sub-samples. The null hypothesis 
of this test is that there is no structural change, that is, the two sets of parameters are 
same. Thus, this test is an F-test. 
As pointed out in Hansen (1997), a main problem with this approach is that the 
date of structural change is endogenous or uninformative. In order to implement this 
test, empirical researchers should either arbitrary select a break date or choose a break 
date considering data behavior. With an arbitrarily chosen break date, the test could be 
informative. If the second is the case, the break date will be endogenous. Thus, the 
result of the Chow test can be different over which break date is chosen. 
                                                 
50
 Chow(1960) 
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Hansen (2001) shows a result of a test for structural change of labor productivity 
in the U.S. from 1947 through 2001. He proposed three possible break dates, 1963, 
1982, and 1994. These proposed break dates are quite different from 1973 which is 
widely believed. This example tells us that researchers need to consider break dates as 
unknown. 
Quandt's (1960) solution is to do the Chow test on every possible break date over 
the study period and to choose the date which gives the largest Chow test statistic. 
This approach looks reasonable.51 However, his solution does not have any 
applications until the 1990s. The main reason is that the chi-square critical values are 
not appropriate since it treats break dates as unknown. Recently, a series of papers 
have solved the unanswered question. Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger 
(1994) provide appropriate confidence intervals.52 Hansen (1997) shows how to 
calculate p-values of asymptotic distributions of some test statistics for structural 
changes. In this chapter, we test if the time series of seventy Korean firms' returns 
have structural breaks. In doing so, we treat break dates as unknown and estimate the 
equation following this modern literature of structural change. 
 
2. Estimation of the Break dates 
We assume that the break dates are unknown and the returns follow AR(1). Thus, 
our goal is to estimate the break dates and test for structural changes of unknown 
timing in linear regression models around the time of the Asian financial crisis on 
seventy firms53 on the Korean Stock Exchange. We report the SupF test statistic from 
                                                 
51
 argmaxF=argminSSR under homoskedasticity 
52
 These confidence intervals are bigger than those of the usual Chi-square. 
53
 This paper is a companion paper of Choe(2008a) and devised to give structural breakdates to the 
paper. That is why we analyzed seventy Korean firms. 
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Quandt (1960), and ExpF and AveF test statistics from Andrews and Ploberger (1994). 
We utilize Hansen's (1997) procedure to obtain the p-values54 of the test statistics. 
Suppose that the model is the AR(1): 
 
with . Thus, we are interested in if θ=(β, σ²) is constant over time.55 To test 
this, the structural change in θ (m×1 vector) can be written by 
where m≤k≤n-m. Any of a Wald, Lagrange multiplier (LM), and likelihood ratio (LR) 
statistics can be used since their asymptotic distributions are same. Let  denote 
one of the test statistics of the hypothesis of no structural change, θ₁=θ₂ for given k. 
Then, we can denote the Quandt test statistic56 as follows: 
The Exp  and Ave  from Andrews and Ploberger (1994) are defined as follows: 
Andrews(1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) show57 that each of these statistics 
                                                 
54
 Hansen(1997) 
55
 This is a different question from if    is stationary or not. 
56
 Quandt (1960) 
57
 Under a set of regularity conditions 
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has the following asymptotic null distribution respectively: 
 
3. Methodology 
The main problem with the Quandt statistic is that one cannot use the chi-square 
distribution to assess statistical significance. If the breakdate is known, one can use the 
distribution. However we are assuming that the date is not known. Thus we need to 
find a function p(x∣θ) which is close to the true function p(x). Hansen (1992) and 
Mackinnon (1994) estimate p-value functions for these nonstandard test statistics. 
Hansen (1992) uses a polynomial,58 x  and 
estimates parameters by a least squares polynomial regression of upper percentiles on 
quantiles. This method was evolved by Mackinnon (1994) through using 
.
59
 Hansen (1997) adds an 
unknown parameter η to allow the distribution to depend on it. Thus, Hansen (1997) 
uses ∣θ) and picks the chi-squared distribution with η 
degrees of freedom, Ψ(·∣η)=χ²(η). In this chapter, we follow Hansen's (1997) choice. 
                                                 
58
 By the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, any bounded continuous function can be arbitrarily well 
approximated on a compact set by a polynomial. 
59
 Ψ is a leading distribution function. In Mackinnon's (1994) paper he uses the standard normal 
distribution. 
 63 
He provides the distributions of Sup , Exp  and Ave   for various values of m 
and pi.60 
 
4. Empirical Results of the Quandt Test 
We estimate the break dates for seventy firms on the KSE from 1994 through 
2005. Firm IDs stand for the Datastream61 tickers. Table 3.1 reports the date which has 
the maximum Chow test statistic during the study period. The third, fourth, and fifth 
columns have the Quandt,62 Exp ,63 and Ave 64 statistics respectively. The numbers 
in parenthesis are the p-values for each corresponding test statistic. 
The Quandt statistics are not significant at the 10% level for YKG, AFM, HDE, 
SSG, SSR, KAA, LUS, DLI, DGB, BOP, HYS, TWI, KUM, and DYY. At the 5% 
significance, those for NYD, HPL, and PIS65 are not significant, either. Thus, we do 
not reject the null hypothesis that these firms have no structural breaks during the 
study period. The reported test statistics are not much different and the three p-values 
corresponding to the test statistics are a little different from each other, but very 
similar. The Appendix provides the Quandt test statistic for two sample firms and the 
Chow test statistic on each possible break date for the two sample firms. 
 
                                                 
60
 We choose 0.15 for pi₀ and m=3. 
61
 All these firms' stock price data were downloaded via the Datastream terminal. 
62
 Quandt (1960) 
63
 Andrew and Ploberger (1994) 
64
 Andrew and Ploberger (1994) 
65
 Including what are listed above. 
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Table 3.1 Test Statistics and p-values 
 
Firm 
ID Break date SupFn(p-value) ExpFn(p-value) AveFn(p-value) 
SGL 14-Jun-00 14.5361 (0.0139) 4.0259 (0.0215) 4.5537 (0.0526) 
KAW 24-Apr-00 61.0454 (0.0000) 26.4789 (0.0000) 29.9734 (0.0003) 
PIS 23-Feb-00 9.8923 (0.0988) 2.4685 (0.1087) 3.0309 (0.1726) 
SKT 11-Aug-03 19.4876 (0.0015) 6.9361 (0.0015) 10.0374 (0.0013) 
SHB 18-Apr-03 14.7209 (0.0128) 4.1458 (0.0190) 3.4965 (0.1196) 
HDR 26-Jul-02 11.8847 (0.0436) 3.1442 (0.0531) 4.0353 (0.0785) 
SGD 10-Aug-99 20.0243 (0.0012) 7.1543 (0.0012) 6.1073 (0.0166) 
YKG 16-Apr-96 4.4035 (0.6578) 0.7280 (0.6948) 1.0890 (0.7391) 
AFM 10-Jun-96 4.9781 (0.5626) 0.8043 (0.6438) 1.3794 (0.6087) 
SSO 27-Mar-03 21.0943 (0.0007) 7.5069 (0.0009) 9.1640 (0.0022) 
HAC 13-Dec-02 11.8154 (0.0449) 3.6246 (0.0323) 6.0928 (0.0167) 
HDE 19-Dec-03 7.7576 (0.2243) 1.7628 (0.2326) 2.5407 (0.2538) 
SSG 18-Jun-03 5.5224 (0.4788) 0.9248 (0.5692) 1.3044 (0.6410) 
KAM 24-Apr-01 42.0917 (0.0000) 17.2522 (0.0000) 16.3904 (0.0001) 
SGF 17-Feb-00 21.1168 (0.0007) 7.6209 (0.0008) 9.8875 (0.0015) 
LCV 14-Apr-04 18.0645 (0.0029) 6.2092 (0.0027) 7.6660 (0.0057) 
CFC 23-Nov-00 13.3229 (0.0236) 3.9318 (0.0236) 5.1684 (0.0330) 
SSR 23-Sep-02 7.2856 (0.2660) 1.3494 (0.3634) 1.7864 (0.4532) 
DOS 21-Jan-03 11.0736 (0.0612) 2.6110 (0.0933) 2.4510 (0.2723) 
SEM 13-Sep-01 15.0478 (0.0111) 3.9876 (0.0223) 5.6659 (0.0228) 
SCT 21-Feb-02 12.6931 (0.0310) 2.9414 (0.0657) 2.9857 (0.1789) 
KAA 30-Sep-97 9.1673 (0.1316) 2.2018 (0.1447) 2.6225 (0.2381) 
KKG 2-Jun-99 20.9484 (0.0008) 7.0138 (0.0014) 5.0470 (0.0362) 
INI 29-Jul-03 13.6426 (0.0206) 3.8076 (0.0268) 4.1889 (0.0697) 
KPV 17-Apr-03 19.3544 (0.0016) 6.2746 (0.0026) 4.6317 (0.0495) 
LUS 24-May-00 6.6969 (0.3267) 1.2131 (0.4205) 1.8160 (0.4433) 
SGA 11-Nov-96 27.2785 (0.0000) 8.1555 (0.0005) 7.9127 (0.0048) 
CSB 18-Jun-99 37.5221 (0.0000) 14.2162 (0.0000) 7.2786 (0.0073) 
HMO 18-Dec-02 19.3914 (0.0016) 6.1400 (0.0029) 7.5310 (0.0062) 
DLI 24-Jul-00 9.5515 (0.1132) 2.7556 (0.0800) 3.6621 (0.1050) 
HKT 12-Feb-99 16.7612 (0.0052) 4.4536 (0.0140) 4.4942 (0.0550) 
HPL 27-Oct-95 11.0945 (0.0606) 3.0810 (0.0567) 4.0131 (0.0798) 
DGB 4-May-01 8.9857 (0.1412) 1.7393 (0.2386) 2.1659 (0.3397) 
CLI 18-Mar-99 43.4867 (0.0000) 17.6430 (0.0000) 12.6429 (0.0004) 
HJS 1-Dec-95 67.9022 (0.0000) 28.6101 (0.0001) 10.2101 (0.0012) 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Firm ID Break date SupFn(p-value) ExpFn(p-value) AveFn(p-value) 
HJY 8-Nov-95 36.8363 (0.0000) 14.1662 (0.0000) 12.2472 (0.0004) 
NHS 27-Feb-98 39.2231 (0.0000) 14.9340 (0.0000) 10.2039 (0.0012) 
KRZ 2-Oct-97 11.9257 (0.0429) 3.4955 (0.0368) 3.8331 (0.0919) 
LTC 24-Dec-99 15.1793 (0.0105) 3.8158 (0.0265) 4.4255 (0.0580) 
BOP 21-Sep-98 8.2861 (0.1844) 1.6522 (0.2622) 2.4689 (0.2685) 
HYS 13-Nov-98 7.2037 (0.2738) 1.6570 (0.2609) 2.4167 (0.2797) 
LCB 17-May-99 19.0421 (0.0018) 5.8378 (0.0038) 5.8097 (0.0206) 
DGY 9-Feb-99 29.3490 (0.0000) 11.5082 (0.0001) 7.1944 (0.0078) 
YHO 18-Jun-98 48.6682 (0.0000) 20.8671 (0.0000) 23.3308 (0.0001) 
KOR 24-Jul-00 27.3484 (0.0000) 9.8548 (0.0002) 9.8548 (0.0002) 
OLB 4-Jun-01 23.2901 (0.0003) 8.6035 (0.0004) 8.1159 (0.0042) 
HYC 2-Jan-01 17.9840 (0.0030) 5.1757 (0.0070) 7.1031 (0.0083) 
DKS 25-Mar-04 12.5310 (0.0332) 3.0300 (0.0598) 3.9041 (0.0869) 
PHM 16-Jan-98 24.6614 (0.0001) 8.2118 (0.0005) 6.5372 (0.0122) 
GTC 29-Jul-99 16.0815 (0.0070) 4.8339 (0.0097) 5.6804 (0.0226) 
HMP 14-Jul-98 15.4586 (0.0093) 4.1587 (0.0188) 4.8075 (0.0433) 
TWR 25-Jan-99 23.3446 (0.0002) 7.9120 (0.0007) 9.7826 (0.0016) 
SYC 24-Oct-97 16.1609 (0.0068) 16.1609 (0.0068) 2.3511 (0.2943) 
TWI 2-Mar-04 7.2226 (0.2720) 1.9330 (0.1935) 2.9545 (0.1834) 
KSM 8-Dec-97 13.3080 (0.0238) 2.6568 (0.0889) 3.4067 (0.1284) 
KUM 10-Nov-03 9.6468 (0.1090) 2.4392 (0.1121) 3.6493 (0.1061) 
KKP 7-Nov-03 13.2834 (0.0240) 3.2893 (0.0456) 3.9273 (0.0854) 
DYY 14-Nov-96 2.6999 (0.9283) 0.5134 (0.8508) 0.9275 (0.8154) 
LGT 24-Jul-00 42.8831 (0.0000) 16.9357 (0.0000) 16.4572 (0.0001) 
DAP 28-Sep-01 49.0622 (0.0000) 20.2267 (0.0000) 20.5775 (0.0001) 
SYD 16-Jun-98 14.5976 (0.0136) 3.7214 (0.0292) 3.8453 (0.0910) 
HII 22-May-98 26.0400 (0.0001) 8.0698 (0.0006) 5.0974 (0.0348) 
PSN 23-Feb-00 23.7197 (0.0002) 7.9028 (0.0007) 6.9455 (0.0092) 
KIA 29-Oct-97 12.0539 (0.0406) 2.5385 (0.1008) 3.2427 (0.1461) 
SSM 18-Jul-02 23.4133 (0.0002) 7.2774 (0.0011) 3.7228 (0.1002) 
HLC 30-Jun-99 30.3116 (0.0000) 10.9405 (0.0001) (8.9414 0.0025) 
KFZ 19-Dec-95 36.5885 (0.0000) 14.0817 (0.0000) 4.7973 (0.0437) 
HNR 26-Dec-96 16.5123 (0.0058) 5.5293 (0.0050) 6.2626 (0.0148) 
NYD 8-Oct-03 10.1302 (0.0899) 2.9427 (0.0656) 3.0308 (0.1727) 
ANI 22-May-00 54.1941 (0.0000) 21.9213 (0.0000) 11.9965 (0.0005) 
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5. Conclusion 
This study examines the structural changes of seventy firms in the Korean Stock 
Exchange around the Asian crisis. The Korean economy was broken up by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, and then it took some years for it to be recovered through the 
effort of the government and firms. Thus, it is natural to think that firms' specific 
parameters might have been changed reflecting firms' efforts to survive the crisis. This 
chapter assumes that the structural break dates are unknown. Then we estimated them 
and test for structural change of unknown timing around the crisis on each of seventy 
firms in the KSE. 
The proposed results are a little different from what are widely believed. At the 5% 
significance, the Quandt statistics for eighteen firms out of seventy are not significant, 
which means that we fail to find evidence of structural breaks in the series. There are 
eight firms which have break dates before the crisis. However, there are forty-four 
firms which have break dates after the crisis. Out of these forty-four firms, twenty-six 
have break dates within three years after the crisis and the rest of them have break 
dates at least three years after the crisis. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 F-statistics 
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CHAPTER 4  
AN EVENT STUDY OF INSIDER TRADING: EXAMINING KOREA BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE ASIAN CRISIS 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines evidence of insider trading in South Korea before and after the 
Asian financial crisis starting in 1997 with an event study approach. We allow firm 
specific parameter change during the study period and estimate the structural break 
dates using Hansen's (1997) method. With this information we divide data sets into 
two subsets to obtain two sets of firm specific parameters and calculate abnormal 
returns. This study uses 567 news announcements from 1994 through 2005 about 
firms on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) and the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). We study evidence of insider trading in the KSE by investigating the 
abnormal returns near the times of the announcements. Data from the NYSE are used 
and serve as benchmarks for comparative analysis between the two markets. We test if 
there are significant abnormal price changes during the designated periods. We find 
that there is strong evidence before the crisis to show that there were abnormal returns 
prior to the news announcements which indicates that there may have been insider 
trading in that period. This contrasts with after the crisis and new corporate 
governance regulations which the evidence of insider trading dissipates. 
 
1. Introduction 
Trading by insiders refers to transactions in a corporation's stock or other securities 
(e.g. bonds or stock options) by corporate insiders such as officers, directors, or large-
shareholders. The Securities and Exchange Act of the U.S. prohibits trading by 
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insiders based on not yet published information by insiders, which is called insider 
trading. Thus, insider trading defined in this fashion is illegal although insiders may 
trade in their own stocks if they are not using material non-public information. This 
has been controversial. Some believe that insider trading is helpful for stock market 
efficiency66 and insist that insider trading should be allowed because it provides 
private information to the market, while others think that it is unfair because insiders 
are more likely to obtain excess returns by exploiting non-public material information 
than those who trade without access to the same information available to insiders. 
Thus, they support the regulation of trading using inside information. 
In a broad sense, trading by insiders may include trading by insiders who do not 
exploit non-public information as well as insider trading based on such information. 
This too is sometimes referred to as “insider trading.”  In legal parlance, however, this 
is not “insider trading” albeit being a form of trading by insiders. Most countries have 
statutes concerning insider trading, but the type of insider trading prohibited by these 
statues is that which is conducted by insiders using material nonpublic information 
obtained through their position. Thus, insiders legally can buy and sell stock in their 
own company all of the time as long as they do not use inside information; their 
trading is restricted and illegal only at certain times and under certain conditions. 
However, we will use the technical/legal definition in which the term "insider trading" 
refers to only illegal insider trading.67  
In most of the developed countries, trading by insiders of a corporation's stock or 
other securities is illegal when insiders use material non-public information. 
                                                 
66
 Masson and Madhavan (1991) report that insider trading lowers the value of the firm at the margin, 
but that greater executive stock ownership raises the value. 
67
 As a legal definition, insider trading is only the illegal form. Trading by insiders encompasses a wider 
scope than insider trading. In the finance literature the legal definition is understood. Thus legal trading 
by insiders is not insider trading. 
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According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH),68 current market prices reflect all 
of the available information, including non-public (private) information. Therefore, 
insiders could not obtain excess returns by employing insider trading, and market 
participants who were instantly informed of trading by insiders could not, either, under 
this form of the hypothesis. However, empirical studies69 show that insiders do obtain 
excess returns through such trading, which is reasonable ground to reject the strong 
form of the EMH. 
We are assuming that stock markets are semi-strong efficient70 but, not strong 
efficient. In this chapter, we examine the strong form of efficiency in the Korean 
Stock Exchange by using the event study method to analyze the behavior of abnormal 
prices surrounding news announcements about firms on this market. Thus we conduct 
a test for the existence of significant abnormal stock price changes. According to the 
EMH,71 which says that stock prices reflect all new public information, changes in 
stock prices before public announcements signify that there may be insider trading 
using or tipping private information and thus the existence of a dishonest trading. 
Once we scrutinize patterns of price change with an event-study approach for the 
periods before and after public news announcements are made, we can acquire 
appropriate evidence of market efficiency and insider trading. If inside information 
leakage does not exist, we will see a clean jump72 in stock prices only on the date 
when the public news announcement is made. On the other hand, if we see increases in 
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 Banz (1981), Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Ferreira (1995), Banerjee and Eckhard (2001) etc. 
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 The semi-strong form EMH states that all publicly available information is fully incorporated into 
asset prices. 
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 The semi-strong form of efficiency 
72
 We are assuming the semi-strong form of efficiency. 
 72 
stock prices not only on that date but also before that date, we may assume that the 
reason for this behavior is illegal insider trading.73 
Our test of the EMH is conducted by looking at the behavior of stock (or 
securities) prices before and after news is made public. The hypothesis tells that stock 
prices should increase or decrease rapidly as soon as the announcement is made and 
should not change after that. Thus, we can infer market efficiency from the behavior 
of stock prices. On the other hand, the behavior of stock prices before the public 
announcement could provide information about market cleanliness like insider trading. 
More specifically, we investigate the evidence for insider trading profitability on the 
KSE before and after the Asian crisis in 1997. We test if abnormal stock price changes 
are significant by using the event study method during these two periods. 
As of 2006, there are three kinds of stock markets74 in Korea. The KSE, which 
opened in 1956, is the first stock market and the biggest one in Korea. After several 
modifications, Korean stock markets have gradually assumed their current form. The 
number of firms on the KSE increased until 1997,75 when it reached 776. After the 
financial restructuring following the Asian crisis, however, it gradually declined to 
684. The total market value of the public stocks in the KSE was about $673.8 billion 
in 2006. 
The Asian crisis which started in July 1997 in Thailand spread rapidly across many 
Asian countries. South Korea was one of the countries most affected by the crisis. As 
the financial crisis affected the Asian countries, many domestic enterprises and 
national governments could not pay their debts in U.S. dollars because their local 
                                                 
73
 According to Heather Tookes' dissertation (2004), a jump before the announcement date could be the 
result of an industry wide shock. Since we consider about one hundred announcements for each 
analyzed case to test abnormal returns and a few instances may be affected by industry wide shocks, we 
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 The three kinds of markets are the Korea Stock Exchange, the Korea Securities Dealers Association 
Automated Quotation, and the over-the-counter market. 
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 The major expansion was after the mid-1980s. 
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currency was very weak due to the crisis. At that time, the IMF suggested multi-billion 
dollar `rescue packages' for each nation, but, the IMF's offers were conditional on 
economic reforms called a structural adjustment package (SAP). According to the 
SAP, each nation had to cut government spending to reduce its deficits, allow 
insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and raise interest rates sharply 
including financial restructuring. During the past ten years, Korea carried out a 
restructuring of its economy and reform of its financial sector partly through the SAP 
and partly by the Korean government's independent judgment. 
In this chapter we analyze the results of the restructuring and reform in terms of 
stock market cleanliness even though they can be evaluated according to some other 
criteria. We divide the study period, from 1994 through 2005, into two sub-periods, 
1994-1997 and 1998-2005, to compare the degree of abnormal returns before the crisis 
and after. Our focus is on finding evidence of whether there was insider trading during 
each study period. 
One serious problem76 for this kind of test is that it is a joint hypothesis test of 
market efficiency and an asset pricing model or insider trading and an asset pricing 
model. That is, one cannot tell the cause between the mis-specified model and no 
insider trading when the results are not significant. However, Fama (1991) writes, 
"The empirical literature on efficiency and asset pricing models passes the acid test of 
scientific usefulness." Thus, we use this method taking his argument. 
In most of the prior literature, studies of insider trading and market efficiency in 
the U.S. have been based on self-reported data to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Since it is natural to think that those who want to use inside 
information to get extra benefits tend to avoid revealing their transactions, the value of 
the self-reported data is questionable if it used as insider trading data. Even though 
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insiders report all of their transactions, it may not be possible to tell which transactions 
are insider trading and which are just transactions by insiders. However, data of 
insider trading based on inside information is extremely difficult to find.77 Thus, we 
utilize another method, the event study method, which may alleviate this problem. 
With announcements data, we obtained evidence that could be interpreted as 
insider trading in the KSE during the period prior to the Asian crisis. The cumulative 
averaged abnormal returns (CAARs) prior to good announcements are high before the 
crisis whereas they are low after the crisis. 
This chapter begins with Section 2, a short summary of relevant statutes 
concerning insider trading focusing on regulations. Section 3 provides the data sources 
and a data description. In Section 4, an estimation strategy using event study methods 
is summarized. Section 5 reports the results of the estimation. Section 6 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
2. Legislation Concerning Insider Trading 
Most developed countries have similar statutes which prohibit insiders from 
buying or selling securities by using undisclosed material information. The scope of 
this chapter, however, is limited to the insider trading in Korea and the U.S. 
 
2.1 Insider trading in Korea 
In 1991, the Korean National Assembly passed a statute which contains a 
provision prohibiting insider trading based on undisclosed material information in 
securities markets. According to the provision, insiders who are informed of 
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undisclosed material information in the course of performing their duties shall not use 
or have another person use the information in connection with the sale and purchase of 
or any other transaction regarding securities issued by the corporation concerned.78 
Insiders who are regulated by the provision include each of the following people 
(including those who were one of the following within the last year): 
(1) The corporation concerned and its officers, employees and agents 
(2) Persons (including the corporation's agents) who hold stocks or 
contribution certificates of 10 percent or more of the total number of voting 
stocks issued or of the total amount of contributions for their own account 
regardless of its actual owner, 
(3) Persons (including the corporation's agents) who have the authority of 
license, authorization, direction, supervision or other authority with respect 
to the corporation concerned under this Act or other regulations, 
(4) Persons (including the corporation's agents) who entered into a contract 
with the corporation concerned, or 
(5) Persons who receive material non-public information from the above 
mentioned persons. 
Undisclosed material information means any information which may have an 
important effect on investors' judgment regarding investments and is not yet disclosed 
to the public by the corporation.79 If insiders are engaged in prohibited trading, they 
might face administrative sanction (e.g. suspension of the business), civil liability to 
contemporaneous traders, or criminal sanctions (e.g. imprisonment for not more than 
ten years). Therefore, insiders have to disclose material information before they trade 
in the securities market to avoid sanctions under the relevant statute. 
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 The Korean Securities and Exchange Act §188-2. 
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 The Korean Securities and Exchange Act §186 and 188-2. 
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2.2 Insider trading in the U.S. 
The definition of insider trading in the U.S. is very similar to that in Korea. It is 
the trading of a corporation's stock or other securities (e.g. bonds or stock options) by 
corporate insiders such as officers, directors, or holders of more than ten percent of the 
firm's shares. Trading by insiders can be legal or illegal, just as in Korea. Insiders 
legally buy and sell stock in their own company all of the time so long as they disclose 
material information. 
Insider trading is illegal only at certain times and under certain conditions. Illegal 
insider trading means the buying or selling of a security by insiders who possess 
material information that is still not public. The scope of insiders includes the 
following: 
(1) Persons who, because of a fiduciary or similar relationship, are afforded 
access to nonpublic investment information from their corporations,80 
(2) Persons who are retained temporarily by the company in whose securities 
they trade such as accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers 
(constructive insiders), 
(3) Insiders who pass information to another person(s) knowing that the other 
person(s) will trade (tipper), or 
(4) The recipient of the information (tippee). 
To run afoul of insider trading regulations, the information must be that which a 
reasonable investor would attach importance to in the making of her decision.81 If 
insiders violate regulations concerning insider trading, they might face many kinds of 
sanctions such as SEC injunctions and disgorgement, civil liability to 
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 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
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contemporaneous traders, civil recovery by "defrauded" sources of confidential 
information under rule 10b-5, civil penalties, and "watchdog" penalties. Controlling 
persons are subject to additional penalties up to $1 million or three times the insider's 
profits (whichever is greater) if they knowingly or recklessly disregard the likelihood 
of insider trading by persons under their control. Therefore, insiders have to report 
their transactions to the SEC if they want their transactions to be legal or they have to 
abstain from selling or buying stocks. 
 
2.3 Comparison between Korea and the U.S. concerning insider trading 
As we have seen above, regulation of insider trading in Korea and the U.S. is very 
similar, especially regarding the definition of major stock owners and materiality of 
information. However, there are some differences, which are the order of reporting 
information and the scope of insiders in the area of tips. In Korea, insiders have to 
report material information before they make transactions in order for them to be legal, 
whereas insiders in U.S. may report their insider transactions within two business days 
of the date the transaction occurred. 
In the U.S, sub-tippees or remote tippees are also liable, just like first tippees, if 
they trade based on non-public information, whereas in Korea only the first tippee, not 
remote tippees, is liable under the relevant statute according to a Korea Supreme Court 
decision.82 
This difference is a serious problem for analyzing insider trading in Korea. Since 
sub-tippees and remote tippees are not liable, it is possible that some insiders can 
make a profit without violating the law if they want. Thus, in Korea it is hard to 
predict that the reported data would include the trading from which insiders obtain 
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abnormal returns by using inside information. On the other side, in the U.S. one could 
predict that the reported data include such trading from which insiders obtain extra 
returns from inside information since all the tippees are liable. Thus we need to make 
one criterion about what illegal insider trading is and to use another way to collect 
information about insider trading since it is not reasonable to analyze insider trading 
with the reported data. We follow the definition of illegal insider trading in the U.S. 
and analyze the behavior of stock prices near announcements. 
 
3. Data 
In this chapter, as mentioned in the above chapter, we adopt the event study 
method, which is used to examine reactions of the markets of interest. As we pointed 
out earlier, one might think that much of the data used in the prior insider trading 
literature was questionable. Since they are self-reported to the SEC and it is most 
likely that insiders tend to avoid revealing their use of inside information to get 
abnormal returns, one might not be sure whether such trading is legal or illegal. There 
is no simple way to prove it.83 
For this reason, we conducted our research in a different way, using the event 
study method to test for illegal insider trading before public news announcements. An 
event study is an analysis of whether there was a statistically significant reaction in 
financial markets to past occurrences of a given type of event that is hypothesized to 
affect public firms' market values. So event studies measure security price changes in 
response to events. Our events are public news announcements about firms and our 
goal is to investigate insider trading around the date of these public announcements. 
This method is based on the semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis. 
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Under this hypothesis, if there is no illegal insider trading before the announcements, 
we can infer that there should be no abnormal price changes in reaction to an event 
until public announcements are made public and a clean jump on the public 
announcement day of the event given that other things are equal. On the other hand, if 
there is insider trading before the public announcements, there should be abnormal 
changes before these public announcements. 
We utilize three kinds of data. The first type of data is daily closing stock price 
data, which are collected for each stock in the U.S. and in Korea. These data for the 
U.S. are obtained from the CRSP and for Korea from the Datastream.84 The second 
type of data is stock market index data, the CRSP Value Weighted Index85 and the 
KOSPI collected from the CRSP and the Datastream respectively as well. The last 
type of data is public news announcements, collected via the Factiva database system86 
and the Korean Investors' Network for Disclosure System (KIND).87 
There are over 600 firms on the Korean Stock Exchange. Among them we selected 
70 firms by screening. First, we did not consider firms that did not exist during the 
entire study period, from January 1994 through December 2005. Then we chose only 
those firms that are actively traded and event newsworthy. Only 70 firms passed this 
screening. For the U.S. stock exchange, we considered only the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index (DJI) constituent firms. Over the study period there were three changes 
in DJI constituents. On Nov. 1, 1999 Chevron, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 
Sears Roebuck, and Union Carbide were replaced by Intel, Microsoft, Home Depot, 
and SBC Communications. On Apr. 8, 2004 International Paper, AT&T, and Eastman 
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Kodak were replaced by Pfizer, Verizon, and the American International Group Inc. 
On Dec. 1, 2005 there was a merger between AT&T and SBC Communications. So 
AT&T rejoined the DJI. Except for Sears Roebuck and Union Carbide, all of the four 
firms existed over the whole study period. The number of DJI constituents is thirty. 
Thus we included 34 companies for the U.S. 
We investigated 567 public news announcements about the Korean and the U.S. 
stock markets from January 1994 through December 2005. First, we classified each of 
these by type of news announcements, bad and good. In order to do so, we evaluated 
the news content and looked at the price change directions after the public 
announcements. For the Korean data, we further divided the total sample into two sub-
sample groups, before-1998 and after-1997. The news announcements we looked at 
contain information about mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, spin-offs, sell-offs, lay-
offs, dividends, joint ventures, and other important corporate events. Table 4.1 shows 
the basic information about the news announcements we collected and use. The 
numbers of announcements are shown by types and study periods. There are a total of 
378 announcements for the Korean firms and 189 announcements for the U.S. firms. 
 
Table 4.1 Numbers of News Announcements by Type 
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The KOSPI and the CRSP Value Weighted Index during the period we consider 
are used for the market portfolios of Korea and the U.S. respectively. Figure 4.1 shows 
the series of the KOSPI over the last years. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The Korean Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) 
 
4. Estimation Procedure: the Event Study Method 
The event study method is one of the most popular methods in the finance and 
economics literature. Kothari and Warner (2006) reports that the number of articles 
published in the five leading88 journals in finance using this method was 565 for the 
years 1974 through 2000. When there is an event which can affect economic variables, 
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economists may be interested in measuring the effect that the event can have on the 
variables. Event study makes it possible to analyze the effect of an event on economic 
variables of interest. 
This method looks at behavior of abnormal returns of securities around event dates 
that researchers are interested in. The basic idea of this method is to obtain normal 
returns for each firm for each day and to compare these to the realized returns of the 
firm. The event study literature uses the term abnormal returns to indicate the 
differences between the two returns. Thus we need to define what normal returns are. 
In this literature, there are many approaches89 available to calculate the abnormal 
returns of a given stock on a given day. In this chapter we use the market model which 
relates the return of a stock to the return of the market portfolio. In this model a 
normal return is the predicted return associated with the market return on the same day. 
In order to calculate normal returns of stock i at time t, we utilize the closing price 
of stock i on day t and the KOSPI or the CRSP Value Weighted Index for each market 
portfolio90 on day t. The realized daily returns of stock i are defined as follows: 
Next, as in the event study literature, we consider an abnormal return at time t as 
the difference between the actual return at time t in the event window and the normal 
return at time t in the window. For firm i, the abnormal return for event date τ is 
defined as follows: 
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 The constant mean model, the market model, the factor model, and the economic model. 
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 The most popular choices for the U.S. market portfolio are the S&P 500 Index, the CRSP Value 
Weighted Index, and the CRSP Equal Weighted Index and for Korea is the KOSPI. 
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where  ,  , and  are the abnormal return, actual, and normal 
returns respectively for the event date τ.  is the given information at the time . The 
market model91 we adopt here assumes a linear relationship between the market return 
and the stock return. For stock i, the market model is 
                  
                                              
                                                      
                                                   
 
where  and  are stock i's return and the market portfolio return at time t 
respectively.92 As in the literature, the basic method we use to obtain abnormal returns 
is to calculate the difference between the realized stock return and the expected stock 
return over the event window using the market model parameter estimates and the 
market index return as a market portfolio return. 
We assume that error terms have zero means and the same  variances overtime 
for each individual i. We also assume no clustering.93 94 Therefore,  ,  and  are 
firm i specific parameters to be estimated with each firm's stock price data over the 
estimation window. We also assume these firm specific parameters of the Korean 
firms may change near the Asian crisis while those of the U.S. firms do not change 
during the study period. Consequently we estimate the parameters of the Korean firms 
dividing samples into two subgroups using the Hansen's (1997) method of dating the 
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Kothari and Warner (2006) concludes "from the standpoint of event study analysis, this flaw is not 
fatal". p.25. 
92
 This model can be written together with a dummy variable. See Salkever (1976) and Karafiath (1998). 
93
 Since our news announcements data do not overlap, this assumption is not too restrictive. 
94
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structural change. We obtained the most plausible break date assuming that it is 
unknown. 
To estimate these parameters first, we defined the event dates. These consist of the 
dates when the firms under consideration made their corporate announcements and 
when news related to the firms first appeared by using Factiva system and the KIND.95 
As stated in the previous section, we analyzed 567 news announcements of 104 firms 
in this study. We chose a 41-day-long event window period, that is, for each 
announcement date, we use twenty days before the day, the day, and twenty days after 
the day as the event window for the event. It is common for an event window to have 
more than one day since researchers are not able to know when the event occurred 
exactly. The length of our event window, however, is longer than those in usual event 
studies. Since we focused on abnormal behavior of stock prices prior to the 
announcement dates, we have a longer window period and look at changes in 
abnormal returns in the event windows. 
We define an estimation window as all of the trading days less the days in event 
windows. The most common method to choose the estimation windows is to select 
only some of the prior trading days96 for each event window. Two issues may arise 
about this common method. The first is that it is very common for a firm to have 
multiple events during the study period. Then this method would mean that all the firm 
specific parameters may change whenever an event occurs. Thus, different parameter 
estimates are used for every different event without testing if those parameters are 
indeed different. The second issue is that not all of the available data is being used to 
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estimate parameters. We decided to use the whole data set97 for estimating the 
parameters.98 
Figure 2 gives some time notations. τ stands for a day in the event window. τ=0 is 
an event date99 we found through Factiva or the KIND system. An event window is 
defined as time from T ₁+1 to T ₂. The estimation window is selected as the time 
period from T0+1 to T ₁and T ₂+1 to T ₃. We included the post-event period in the 
estimation window. Let L100 be the length101 of the estimation window and L0=T₂-T₁ 
be the length of the event window. 102 
  
Figure 4.2 Time Line for an Event Study 
 
We obtain the three market model parameter estimates by using the ordinary least 
square (OLS) method. Under the regularity conditions, OLS estimators are consistent 
and efficient. In this chapter we assume these conditions hold. We assume that the 
market model parameters are the same throughout the study period for the U.S. while 
allowing for a difference in the parameters between the two periods, before the 
structural break date and after for Korea if the break date is significant.103 Therefore 
we estimate two sets of parameters for Korea and one set of parameters for the U.S. In 
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 From Choe (2007), fourteen firms (YKG, AFM, HDE, SSG, SSR, KAA, LUS, DLI, DGB, BOP, 
TWI, KUM, HYS, AND DYY) do not have any significant structural break date during the study period. 
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order not to overlap the event window and the estimation window, we choose days 
which do not belong to any event windows over the study period as the estimation 
window. After obtaining estimates of the parameters, we use these estimates to 
calculate the expected stock return at each event date τ. 
 
 
With these estimates, we can measure the sample abnormal returns for firm i and for 
the event date τ which is the error term of the market model. 
 
                                 
Under the null hypothesis that the event has no impact on the stock returns, 
abnormal returns in the event window follow the conditional distribution 
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Once we obtain the abnormal returns, we can calculate the average abnormal returns, 
 at each date τ in the event window. Then we aggregate these average abnormal 
returns over the event window. Given N events, the cumulative average abnormal 
return from τ₁ to τ₂, where T₁<τ₁ ≤ τ₂ ≤T₂, for stock i is . Then it 
can be defined as follows: 
Under the null hypothesis, that the normal returns are zero, the cumulative average 
abnormal returns in the event window follows the distribution 
 
            
 
where  and . 
This distribution of CAAR can be used to test the null hypothesis with the following 
test statistic: 
 
   
 
This result is asymptotic with respect to the number of stocks and the length of 
estimation window L. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Abnormal Returns 
For the U.S. firms, first we estimate the parameters over the whole period and then 
calculate the CAARs. For the Korean firms, we divide the events into two categories 
along the period since we want to investigate insider trading behavior changes in the 
KSE between the period before the structural break date and after. 
We estimate the market model parameters,  ,  and  for each U.S. firm and 
Korean firm. As stated in the previous section, 56 Korean firms out of 70 have 
significant structural break dates. For these firms, we estimate two sets of parameters, 
that is,  and   with the estimation window 
which we defined as the whole study period less the event windows. With these 
estimates, we obtain normal returns for each firm and calculate sample abnormal 
returns for each period in the event windows. Then we average the abnormal returns 
over events and firms and finally obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR) over the event period. 
The following Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the average abnormal returns (AARs) 
for good events and bad events respectively. For good events, the AAR of Korean 
firms before the crisis is significantly different from zero on 10th, 4th, 2nd, and 1st 
day before events at the 5% level of significance. After the crisis, however, the AAR 
of Korean firms is only significantly different from zero on the 17th days before 
events at the 5% level. Dow Jones firms have significant AAR only on 19th day 
before the events. Figure 3 depicts the three AARs for good events for 20 days before 
events. 
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Figure 4.3 Average Abnormal Returns for Good Events before the Crisis 
 
Table 4.2 Average Abnormal Returns for Good Events before the Crisis 
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Figure 4.4 Average Abnormal Returns for Bad Events before the Crisis 
 
Table 4.3 Average Abnormal Returns for Bad Events before the Crisis 
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For bad events before the crisis, the behavior of AARs looks different. Korean 
firms do not have any significant AAR before events at the 5% level. On the other 
hand, all the six AARs on the event day are significantly different from zero. Figure 
4.4 shows the AARs for bad events. 
The following Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 report the cumulative average abnormal 
returns which are calculated from 20 days before for each type of events. Two separate 
graphs for Korea and one for the U.S. are shown in Figure 4.4 and 4.5. First of all, 
comparing to the U.S. CAAR line, which does not move up much prior to the time τ=0, 
surprisingly before-crisis Korean CAARs for good events show a clear upward 
movement prior to the announcement date. Around ten days before the event date it 
starts up and continues until around ten days after the date. The movement before the 
event date may be interpreted as insider trading. On the other hand, as we shall show 
below, after-crisis Korean CAARs for good events do not move much prior to the date. 
They behave like the CAARs of DJ firms for good events, which is our benchmark 
line. In Table 4.4 the CAAR of Korean firms for the before crisis period becomes 
significant after τ=-3 at the 5% level but the other two CAARs do not show any 
significant period except for the 9th day before events for DJ firms. 
Figure 4.6 shows the movements of CAARs for the bad events near the 
announcement dates. For these CAARs, an unexpected movement is observed: going 
up a few days prior to the announcement date of bad events. This abnormal 
phenomenon might be explained by considering the tendency that firms want to avoid 
taking big falls of their stock prices. Thus one could think that they might reveal good 
news before announcing bad news if they could. However we do not delve into this 
issue in this chapter. We postpone explaining this to another research. This going up 
behavior of CAARs is much bigger in the before-crisis CAARs than after-crisis. Thus, 
one could think the market became cleaner after the Asian crisis than before. 
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While the U.S. CAARs do not seem to have a particular pattern, the two Korean 
CAARs, from about 20 days prior to the announcement date slowly decrease and keep 
getting lower until about 7 days before the announcement date. After that both CAARs 
start going up until the announcement date and suddenly plummet on the date even 
though the after-crisis Korean CAAR seems to get much lower. This is because it does 
not go up as much as the before-crisis Korean CAAR does. These curves also show 
the over-falling behavior of bad events which is consistent with the existing literature. 
These two different behaviors of CAARs in the post event period are shown more 
clearly in Table 4.6 and 4.7. Most of the CAARs of Korean firms for the good events 
are significant at the 10% level if they are calculated from τ=-10. However none of the 
CAARs for bad events of DJ or Korean firms are significant even at the 10% level. 
In Figure 4.4, the notable increase in CAARs following good events for Korean 
firms indicates that there may have been significant insider trading behavior before the 
crisis in the KSE. After the crisis, however, this behavior seems to be reduced since 
there is not significant movement of CAARs in the pre-event period. 
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Figure 4.5 Cumulative AARs for Good Events 
 
 
Table 4.4 Cumulative AARs for Good Events 
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Figure 4.6 Cumulative AARs for Bad Events 
 
 
Table 4.5 Cumulative AARs for Bad Events 
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Figure 4.7 Cumulative AARs for Good Events 
 
 
Table 4.6 Cumulative AARs for Good Events 
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Figure 4.8 Cumulative AARs for Bad Events 
 
 
Table 4.7 Cumulative AARs for Bad Events 
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5.2 Abnormal Volume 
Many works report that abnormal trading volume can be used to analyze 
information leakage through the event study. The basic idea of this comes from the 
market microstructure literature. According to the literature, when a piece of news 
arrives, it affects the magnitude of the trading volume of the associated stock. It makes 
the trading volume bigger. Thus, we set up a model to test if there is abnormal volume 
before announcements with the null hypothesis that the abnormal volume is zero for 
both good and bad events against the alternative that it is greater than zero. Therefore 
we did one-sided tests with the same alternative hypothesis for both good and bad 
events. 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989) show that raw trading volume of securities is highly 
nonnormal. They find, however, a log-transformation of trading volume yields 
normally distributed measures. Their work analyzes initially the distribution of the raw 
trading volume and provides valuable insights into the use of trading volume measures 
in an event study setting. As seen in Figures 4.9 and 4.10, 104  trading volume does not 
seem to be normally distributed, but after log transformation, it follows the normal 
distribution.105 
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Figure 4.9 Value Traded (Raw Volume) 
 
Figure 4.10 Value Traded (Log Transformed Volume) 
 
Meulbroek (1990) reports a significant day-of-the-week effect in trading volume 
data in her work. Thus we adapt the log-transformation and the day-of-the-week effect 
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in this work. There is one important different fact about daily trading volume from 
daily stock returns. The former exhibits first order autocorrelation in most cases. If 
autocorrelations are ignored, then the test statistics will be overestimated and, as a 
result, the null hypothesis will be over-rejected. Therefore, this feature must be 
incorporated in the model to test abnormal trading volume. 
We take care of all these special features of trading volume data and estimate the 
following relationship,  
 
   
 
 is log-transformed volume at day t, the s are day-of-the-week dummy 
variables for Monday through Thursday, and   is the mean zero, normally distributed 
error term of stock i on day t. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the results for the averaged 
abnormal volume.106 For good events in Korea the trading volume is significantly 
bigger than normal volume two days before the announcements before the crisis while 
after the crisis there is no significant abnormal volume up to more than ten days before. 
Dow Jones firms' data shows there is a significant abnormal volume eight and thirteen 
days before the announcements. For bad events, only Korean data before crisis 
exhibits significant abnormal volume on the seventeenth and eleventh days before the 
announcements at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
106
 We do not use the cumulative averaged abnormal volume to see the behavior of abnormal volume 
since the model is set up by the difference of log volume. Even though there is a positive abnormal 
volume, the CAAV may not detect it if the difference is zero. 
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Figure 4.11 Average Abnormal Volume for Good Events 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 Average Abnormal Volume for Good Events 
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Figure 4.12 Average Abnormal Volume for Bad Events 
 
 
Table 4.9 Average Abnormal Volume for Bad Events 
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We provide one more analysis following methods from Bhattacharya, Daouk, 
Jorgenson, and Kehr (2000). They report the normalized daily volume figure in their 
paper. The normalized daily volume is calculated by dividing volume of a stock by the 
average daily trading volume of it in the event period and then by averaging across all 
stocks for each day. Figures 13 and 14 show the normalized daily volume for good 
and bad events respectively. Only Korean firms' data before the crisis exhibits 
relatively large normalized volumes for some days before the announcements. This 
result is consistent with that of in the previous section. 
Figure 4.13 The Normalized Daily Volume for Good Events 
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Figure 4.14 The Normalized Daily Volume for Bad Events 
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigated evidence of insider trading in the periods before and after the 
Asian crisis using the event study method. We used all the available data during the 
study period to estimate firm specific parameters and divide the data sets of Korean 
firms into before and after subsets according to the results of estimation of structural 
changes. Then we use these estimates to calculate abnormal returns. 
    The behavior of abnormal returns for good news in the KSE revealed the 
possibility that there may have been insider trading before the crisis. On the other hand, 
we did not find any evidence of information leakage during the study period after the 
crisis. With these observations, we could compare what happened in the two periods 
considered and with this comparison we can conclude that insider trading behavior 
decreased after the crisis. Consequently we conclude that the KSE became better in 
terms of cleanliness after restructuring and reform following the Asian crisis. 
 104 
REFERENCES 
Ajinkya and Jain (1989) "The Behavior of Daily Stock Market Trading Volume" 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11 (Nov.) pp.331-59. 
Banz, R.W.(1981) "The Relationship between Return and Market Value of Common 
Stocks." Journal of Financial Economics. 9, pp. 3-18. 
Banerjee, A. and E.W. Eckard (2001) "Why regulate insider trading? Evidence from 
the first Great Merger Wave (1896-1903)" The American Economic Review 
91, 1329-1349. 
Bhattacharya, Utpal, Hazem Daouk , Brian Jorgensen, and Carl-Heinrich Kehr. (2000) 
"When an Event is Not an Event: The Strange Case of an Emerging Market, 
Journal of Financial Economics, v. 55, pp. 69-101. 
Choe, Hyunkyung (2007) "Estimation of Unknown Structural Changes of Firms on the 
KSE." 
DaGraca, Tarcisio B. and Robert T. Masson (2004) "More Power to You: 
Demonstrating a More Powerful Event Study Methodology with Privatization 
Auction Data." Cornell University mimeo. 
Fama, Eugene F. (1970b) "Multiperiod Consumption-investment Decisions." 
American Economic Review 55: March, pp 163-174. 
Fama, Eugene F. (1991) "Efficient Capital Markets: II" Journal of Finance. 46:5, pp. 
1575-617. 
Fama, Eugene F. (1998) "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral 
finance", Journal of Financial Economics 49, pp.283-306. 
Ferreira, Eurico J (1995) "Insider Trading Activity, Different Market Regimens, and 
Abnormal Returns". The Financial Review. 2:May, pp. 193-210 
Hansen, Bruce E (1997) "Approximate Asymptotic P-values for Structural Change 
Tests." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15:1, pp. 60-67. 
Karafiath, Imre (1998) "Using Dummy Variable in the Event Methodology" Financial 
Review. 23:3, pp. 351-57. 
Keown, A. J. and J. M. Pinkerton (1981) "Merger announcements and insider trading 
activity: An empirical investigation" Journal of Finance 36, 855-869. 
Kothari S.P. and Jerold B. Warner(2006) "Econometrics of Event Studies". Handbook 
of Corporate Finance. Elsevier-North-Holland. 
 105 
MacKinlay, Craig (1997) "Event Studies in Economics and Finance." Journal of 
Economic Literature. 35, pp. 13-39. 
Masson, Robert T. and Ananth Madhavan (1991) "Insider Trading and the Value of 
the Firm". The Journal of Industrial Economics. 39:4. pp. 333-53. 
Meulbroek, Lisa K. (1992) "An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading." Journal 
of Finance 47, pp. 1661--1699. 
Salkever, David S. (1976) "The Use of Dummy Variables to Compute Predictions, 
Prediction Errors, and Confidence Intervals." Journal of Econometrics. 4:4, pp. 
393-97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106 
CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
The Asian crisis in 1997 affected many Asian countries including Korea. 
Following the crisis, rapid changes were made in government policies and the 
economic environment to overcome the effect of the big shock on the economy, firms, 
and corporate environment. Policy changes in the beginning stage focused on the 
stability of the foreign exchange market, that is, the stability of the Korean won. To 
implement this, the government promoted reforms on four parts: reform of corporate 
structures, reform of the financial sector, reform of labor relationships, and reform of 
government-owned corporations. 
The government policy in the beginning was to constrict aggregate demand in 
order to decrease imports and then to keep more foreign reserves. As a result, the 
annual interest rate rose steeply to 30%.107 After that the exchange rate was stabilized 
and the liquidity problem was solved by the middle of 1998. Accordingly, the 
government changed its policy from contraction to stimulation of the economy.  
Reform of corporate structure focused on liquidating faltering enterprises in the 
short run, and preventing recurrence of a financial crisis in the long run. Liquidating 
faltering enterprises was implemented through workouts and exchanging businesses 
between Chaebols, the so called Big Deals. The ‘5 and 3 rules’ were the basis for 
prevention of another financial crisis. The reform of the financial sector was the most 
important and elaborated reform. The government used public funds to normalize the 
financial sector and established a comprehensive monitoring institution108 to control 
all types of financial agents.  
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Also, the government legislated layoffs while implementing reform of the 
corporate structure of Chaebols and the financial sector. The government’s plan for 
privatization of government-owned corporations was to immediately privatize 5 of the 
26 government-owned corporations, to step by step privatize 6 others, and to reform 
the structures of the remaining 15 corporations.  
This reform which was implemented following the crisis, played an important role 
in defending enterprises and the financial sector against insolvency and contributed to 
the soundness of the financial structure. Foreign direct investment, exchange trading, 
and liberalization of the capital market made a rapid progress through opening of 
financial markets. Also, business transparency has been enhanced by requiring the 
Chaebols to report joint financial statements and by the amending of business 
accounting standards. With regard to corporate governance structure, the outside 
director system has been required by law and minority shareholders’ rights have been 
strengthened. 
In this dissertation we examined corporate governance, firms, and insider trading 
in Korea before and after the Asian financial crisis. In Chapter 1, we explained the 
situation which Korea was in and introduced the government policies that were 
implemented to overcome the shock to the economy. In Chapter 2, we investigated 
how corporate governance has changed since the crisis and what are the problems with 
Korean corporations. Also, using the Fama-French three factor model,109 we analyzed 
how corporate governance changes affect firm value. We found that firms obtained 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns during the period 1998-1999 when 
major changes in corporate governance were made. Also we found the abnormal 
return of Chaebol firms was significantly larger than that of non-Chaebol firms during 
the same period. With respect to the outside director system, the abnormal return of 
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KSE firms was significantly larger than that of KOSDAQ firms in 1998 when the 
system was introduced only to the KSE. However, the abnormal return of KOSDAQ 
firms was significantly higher than that of KSE firms in 2001 when the system was 
extended to the KOSDAQ market. With this finding we could conclude that 
introduction of the outside director system affected firm value positively. We also 
tested if firm size affects firm value differently. Our finding is that both small firms 
and large firms obtained statistically significant positive abnormal returns, but the 
abnormal return of small firms was significantly smaller than that of large firms. 
However, we failed to find evidence that corporate governance reform negatively 
affected the value of small firms. 
In Chapter 3, we estimated structural breaks for seventy KSE firms and did 
inference using Hansen’s p-value.110 The break dates of most of the sample of firms 
were found around the Asian crisis, but some firms do not have any break dates, and 
other firms have their break dates more than two years later than the crisis 
In the Chapter 4, we examined the degree of insider trading before and after the 
crisis. Since the degree is not an observable variable, we utilized the event study 
method. We found evidence of insider trading before the crisis by observing abnormal 
returns prior to the public announcements of good events.  After the crisis, however, 
there were no abnormal returns prior to public announcements.  We compared our 
results with data for the United States which had no abnormal returns prior to 
announcement dates.  Putting these factors together, we concluded that corporate 
governance reforms after the crisis were effective in reducing insider trading in Korea. 
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